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 Chapter 3 
 Federalism and Inequality in Education: What 
Can History Tell Us? 
 Carl  Kaestle 
 Abstract  This chapter assesses the history of government efforts in the United 
States to enhance opportunity in education and to suggest lessons from the past. We 
focus primarily on federal policy, keeping in mind that solutions must depend upon 
successfully blending the resources and prerogatives of the federal government, the 
states, and local school districts. This chapter takes a chronological look, starting at 
free public education’s onset to provide a foundation for the problems of inequality 
we face today. It then moves through the expanding federal role in the post-World 
War II years, followed by the battles over desegregation and the focus on providing 
resources to disadvantaged students. It then discusses standards-based reform, with 
a focus on how we arrived at the No Child Left Behind law and the issues surround-
ing the Common Core. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
which targets impoverished students, is reviewed in detail. The lack of connection 
between Title I assignments and family income level, as well as lack of connection 
between Title I assignment and performance on the National Assessment of 
Academic Progress (NAEP), renders research results inconclusive in judging Title 
I’s effects, but given that NAEP does show increasing average scores for Black and 
Hispanic students as well as declining gaps between those groups and White stu-
dents, the evidence is suffi cient that the program should be continued and improved. 
The chapter concludes by drawing some generalizations about the federalist gover-
nance system and its relation to educational equity and offers suggestions on ways 
to move forward, including changes regarding Title I and the federal role in 
education. 
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 Introduction 
 This chapter  assesses the history of government efforts in the United States to 
enhance opportunity in education and to suggest lessons from the past. We focus 
primarily on  federal policy , keeping in mind that solutions must depend upon suc-
cessfully blending the resources and prerogatives of the federal government, the 
states, and local school districts. Of course, initiatives do not always stem from the 
federal government. Sometimes the states are the innovators and become models for 
 federal education initiatives . Also, the landscape is complicated because members 
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches at each level can initiate action, 
sometimes opposing one another. Federalism is not simply a system of congenially 
shared responsibilities. 
 In fact, shared governance in education policy arouses the alter egos of federal-
ism:  centralism and  localism . Localists believe that governance and authority should 
be largely local because decisions made close to home are more effi cient, more 
responsive, and more democratic. They believe that centralized decisions are inef-
fi cient and intrusive. Centralists believe that some values are best initiated by the 
federal government, that the central government should promote practices that serve 
our notions of civil rights, sound education, and national priorities. 
 This chapter takes a chronological look, starting at the onset of  free public edu-
cation . It then moves through the expanding  federal role in the post-World War II 
years , followed by the battles over  desegregation and the focus on providing 
resources to disadvantaged students. It then discusses  standards-based reform , 
with a focus on how we arrived at the  No Child Left Behind law and the issues 
surrounding the  Common Core . Following the chronology, I end by evaluating the 
outcomes of these reform efforts and offering suggestions on ways to move 
forward. 
 Throughout the chapter, the overriding strand of thought is examination of equal 
opportunity through these various periods, including equity in how resources are 
devoted to the poor and other populations as well as removing barriers such as seg-
regation. The theme of developing a  meritocracy has been a long-existing theme in 
America as well, increasingly so beginning in the 1950s. Overall quality of educa-
tion, not just equality, is discussed in latter sections as well as it has entered the fray 
via standards-based reform and the focus on improving education at all schools for 
all students, not just closing  achievement gaps . 
 In discussing inequalities in educational achievement, we should keep in mind a 
few thoughts. First, there are various types of inequities—in students’ health, hous-
ing, income, and parents’ education. Also, achievement gaps across race-ethnic and 
income groups are very resilient. To reduce them, it is logical to reach beyond the 
schools to think about educational disadvantage in terms of these inequities. 
Furthermore, if we measure success by our standards for equity today, in truth all 
past efforts will come up short; our concepts of inclusiveness today are much 
broader than before. Lastly, data for such comparisons were nonexistent until recent 
decades. Thus, when we say that the  National Defense Education Act of 1958 
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“worked,” we do not mean that scores rose in science. More often the evidence is in 
photographs of children smiling in front of test tubes. In 1963,  Francis Keppel ,  John 
Kennedy ’s new commissioner of education, complained to a friend that the  Offi ce 
of Education did not have a single scrap of data on learning outcomes. Although 
Senator  Robert Kennedy insisted that the  Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA) of 1965 require accountability through testing academic achievement, it 
took the federal government over 20 years to implement Kennedy’s mandate 
effectively. 1 
 Development of Free and Public Schools 
Through the Progressive Era 
 The Creation of Free Public School Systems, 1840–1860 
 We begin with the states’ creation of free school systems in the 1840s, building 
upon local efforts. Traditional educational historians argued that the fountainhead 
of our public schools was the district school in small-town colonial New England. 
But that claim is infl ated as some New England towns did not establish schools, and 
barriers existed from the outset. In towns with public schools, girls faced shorter 
sessions and lower expectations and were banned from the grammar schools and 
colleges. Most children of color were excluded at all levels, left unlettered, or taught 
by their parents. Children from poorer White families faced the barrier of “continu-
ation school”—a part of the school year that wasn’t free. 
 The “common school” reformers of the 1840s reacted to some of these limita-
tions. They wanted to attract as many students as possible into a single system, not 
just to equalize opportunity but for social stability through state-sponsored moral 
education and mutual understanding across class lines. Many wealthy families 
declined the invitation, but in general the common school reformers in the Northeast 
and the new Northwest gained their main objectives by 1860: free schooling sup-
ported by local property taxes, the consolidation of small districts into town sys-
tems, and some state-sponsored teacher training (Kaestle  1983 ). 
 This was not simply a top-down state initiative. Enrollments were increasing in 
the early nineteenth century before the  common school movement . This was partly 
because of an increase in  girls’ education and partly because states encouraged 
towns to organize school districts and levy taxes for schools. In addition to these 
local initiatives and state actions, many states had access to funds that derived from 
federal lands. Nonetheless, until the mid-twentieth century, the lion’s share of the 
funds for free public education was from local  property taxes (Goldin and Katz 
 2008 ; Kaestle and Vinovskis  1980 ). 
1  For the accountability amendment by Robert Kennedy, and Francis Keppel’s efforts to develop 
more reliable assessments, see Kaestle ( Forthcoming ). For an effort to reach back to earlier decades 
and estimate changes in students’ reading ability, see Kaestle and Stedman ( 1987 ). 
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 The establishment of free public schools across the Northeast and the Midwest 
improved equality of opportunity in education. Enrollments, daily attendance, and 
the length of the school year increased. Of course, the remaining barriers for people 
of color, children with disabilities, and women are striking from today’s perspec-
tive. Increased opportunity also did not immediately result in closer-to-equal 
amounts of education received by working-class children. 
 Two other factors led to unequal outcomes. First, school attendance was not 
mandatory, so bias existed due to working-class families reacting to their economic 
realities and their family culture, with children and teens working instead of attend-
ing class (Kaestle and Vinovskis  1980 , 82–99). Second, unequal resources across 
districts meant different school quality and length of school year. Funding schools 
through local property taxes is one of the most abjectly unequal aspects of public 
education in the United States. It is still with us today, and rare among nations. 
 1865–1895: Expansion and Professionalization 
 In the period of 1865–1895, public schooling underwent more expansion and pro-
fessionalization. Urban school systems acquired professional superintendents and 
became the model for well-run schooling. Testing, long before the IQ vogue, served 
superintendents as a way to monitor quality among teachers and schools.  Teacher 
training began in newly developed “normal schools” and shorter-term “teachers 
institutes.” The effect on educational opportunity is not easy to quantify, but enroll-
ments, attendance, and length of school year continued their upward trajectory. 
Toward the end of this period, public high schools outnumbered private academies 
but were still predominantly the preserve of middle class students, the children of 
professionals, shopkeepers, engineers, offi ce workers, accountants, skilled crafts-
men, and others (on testing, see Reese  2013 ; on the expansion of elementary educa-
tion, and information on academies, see Goldin and Katz  2008 , 129–62). 
 The ‘Progressive’ Era: Redefi ning Equal Opportunity 
 Local reformers praised their high schools as the “keystone of the arch,” or the “cap-
stone” of a “perfect system.” Reformers praised these new secondary schools as an 
institution of meritocracy, free and open to all. High school students were predomi-
nantly female (about 60 %) in the late nineteenth century, though the increasing 
restriction of child labor in the manufacturing sector meant that more working-class 
boys stayed in school as the new century unfolded. The percentage of 14- to 17-year- 
olds in school grew from 11 % in 1900 to 32 % in 1920 and became the modal 
experience at 51 % in 1930 (Simon and Grant  1970 ; on the development of high 
school, see Reese  1995 ; Krug  1964 ; Rury  2005 , 84–89). 
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 As the proportion of youth in high schools increased, it became apparent that not 
all students were preparing to go to college. This generated a great deal of thought 
about what curricula were appropriate for students with different educational and 
occupational futures. These discussions occurred in an era when theorists of human 
behavior were placing great emphasis on  heredity , when racism was increasing in 
social relations, and an imperialist foreign policy thrust the United States into the 
development of colonies.  Standardized student  testing moved from its mid- nineteenth- 
century roots to its hereditarian embrace with IQ tests, all putting a genetic hue on the 
emerging version of meritocracy (see Reese  2013 ; Kaestle  2012 , 93). 
 Educators talked about “hand minded” and “brain minded” children and their 
different needs. In an explicit revision of equal opportunity, they developed different 
curricula for different children. Refl ecting a growing conviction among educators, 
Stanford’s Ellwood Cubberley ( 1909 , 57) declared that people should reject the 
“exceedingly democratic idea that all are equal, and that our society is devoid of 
classes.” 
 Many saw the creation of  collegiate, general, vocational, and commercial  tracks 
as steps forward for democracy: These different curricula would augment equal 
opportunity by providing an appropriate high school education for everybody. This 
was the era of corporate capitalism; in this context, democracy required not only 
participation and citizens’ education but also expertise, science, and effi ciency. 
Whatever the merits of this new concept of equal opportunity—and we should not 
think it merely as a hypocritical justifi cation for inequality—it was compromised by 
biased predictions of students’ futures, too often arising from their race, gender, 
ethnicity, and social class. 
 Expanding the Federal Role in Education (World War II 
to the Space Race) 
 The Postwar Years 
 Before 1950 the federal government played a minimal role in elementary, second-
ary, and higher education. It had partially funded the early development of public 
schools in the states through land grants in the early nineteenth century, and it had 
expanded opportunity for college attendance by creating land-grant colleges in the 
late nineteenth century. It had also given modest support for the differentiation of 
curriculum through its  vocational education grants beginning in the early twentieth 
century. For the most part, however, education funding and policy were almost 
entirely in the hands of the states and local districts. The federal share of local 
school budgets in 1950 was, on average, 2.9 %. 
 Congress made its fi rst foray into federal education funding in 1941 with the 
enactment of what would be called “ impact aid ,” which compensated communities 
that saw an infl ux of schoolchildren amid the swift expansion of tax-exempt  military 
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facilities. But the key major war-related federal activity in education was the 
Servicemen’s Rehabilitation Act (1944), which provided educational support, hous-
ing loans, rehabilitation training, and other benefi ts to military personnel returning 
home after World War II. The principal benefi ciaries of this “ GI Bill ” were White 
males, because many of its programs and program offi cers were biased against 
Black GIs and because the numbers of servicewomen were a tiny percentage of all 
returning veterans. For White males, however, it provided substantial opportunities 
in college or other education. It also helped to double the number of college gradu-
ates in the decade following 1945 (see Bound and Turner  2002 , 784–815; Turner 
and Bound  2003 .) 
 Liberal  Congress members and the  National Education Association lobbied for 
federal aid, not for programs targeted at particular educational goals but for con-
struction, teacher salaries, or simply for spending at the discretion of local school 
boards. Their bills, however, were routinely defeated in the 1940s and 1950s, as 
they also were in the 1920s and 1930s. Opponents included southern segregationist 
Democrats, who feared that federal aid would be used to press for integration; 
Roman Catholic representatives, who supported their churches’ position against 
federal aid to public schools; and conservative Republicans, who opposed federal 
aid as something intrusive and foreign-inspired. This effective Congressional alli-
ance was dubbed the “3 R’s” of localism in education policy: race, religion, and 
“Reds.” 
 It should be recognized, however, that not all opposition to federal aid was sim-
ply motivated by these negatives. The positive image of local control was shared by 
President  Eisenhower , his friend  James Conant —the most respected education 
reformer of the 1950s—and many local leaders. They saw local control as a spur to 
citizens’ participation and support for public education, as well as a more effi cient, 
responsive, and democratic form of governance. Unfortunately, those who champi-
oned local control of schools, either consciously or unconsciously, also favored 
inequality as well, not only because of racial segregation but because of vast dispari-
ties of  per-pupil expenditures in districts with different property wealth. 
 Education, the Space Race, and Meritocracy 
 We have seen that at the secondary level educators had already established a notion 
of meritocracy in the early twentieth century, long before the advent of the  SATs , 
which were designed to promote that goal. It was grounded in achievement testing, 
teachers’ reports, guidance counselors’ decisions, and the differentiated curricula of 
the “comprehensive American high school.” By the early 1950s, many critics of the 
public schools focused on the weak version of Progressive education known as 
“ Life Adjustment ,” which focused on practical tasks for the large middle group of 
students who were neither in the higher academic tracks nor in vocational 
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education. 2 This criticism took the high road of equality, demanding the same aca-
demic curriculum for all, but it had little effect on school practice. The professional 
devotion to Life Adjustment was substantial, from school district offi ces to the fed-
eral Offi ce of Education. The idea that meritocracy meant different curricula for 
differently able students, a legacy of the  Progressive Era , was deeply embedded in 
the schools. 
 Meanwhile the American science and technology community was growing anx-
ious about academic learning in the schools as a matter of national security and 
national competition. The brief public scare following the launch of Sputnik into 
space by the Russians in 1957 energized these concerns. Through skillful politick-
ing by the bill’s handlers and some concessions to Catholic educators, the National 
Defense Education Act (NDEA) was passed the following year. It was not designed 
to equalize opportunity but to raise the academic quality of schoolwork in the sci-
ences, mathematics, and foreign languages, especially for the most academically 
talented students. By turning attention away from the utilitarian Life Adjustment 
curriculum, however, it may have had some positive effect across a range of high 
school students. On the other hand, the grants required a 50 % match by the local 
district, suggesting that wealthier districts were more likely to apply for NDEA 
grants, thus reinforcing inequality (on the passage of NDEA, see Urban  2010 ). 
 Historian  David Gamson has argued that the NDEA was supported by educators 
around the nation not just because everyone was alarmed by the launch of Sputnik 
but because the programs of the NDEA were easily compatible with the aims and 
programs in the fi eld. This was a startling interpretation at fi rst, because journalists 
at the time and many historians since have emphasized that Sputnik shocked the 
schools into rethinking their fl abby “progressive” curricula and introducing more 
academically rigorous courses in math, science, and languages. This is a half-truth. 
The other half is that several of the underlying assumptions and intentions were 
legacies of the Progressive era, when educators had invented the multiple-curricula 
high school, with an emphasis on testing and guidance, all of which was revived and 
advocated in  1959 by Conant’s popular book,  The American High School Today , the 
bible of the “ comprehensive ”  high school (see Gamson  2007 ). 
 The NDEA was more important to the federal role in education than it was to 
expanding educational opportunity. There had been no federal grant programs gen-
erally open to all public schools except for vocational education. NDEA prevailed 
over a storm of opposition about the perils of federal aid to education, succeeding 
politically for several reasons. It abandoned the goal of the professional education 
organizations to get “ general” aid with no requirements attached. NDEA was a “ cat-
egorical ” bill, like vocational education. It prescribed which subject areas were eli-
gible for support. It specifi ed the need for language labs. It supported area studies in 
higher education and instruction in languages generally not taught in the United 
States. 
2  The most widely debated assault was from Arthur Bestor, a historian at the University of Illinois, 
in his  Educational Wastelands: The Retreat from Learning in Our Schools ( 1953 ). See Kaestle 
( 1990 ). 
3 Federalism and Inequality in Education: What Can History Tell Us?
42
 Congress was more receptive to this kind of bill. In contrast to general school 
aid, it gave the impression of accountability: dollars paid for programs established. 
It honored the state education agencies, which received the money and monitored 
the programs. Flexibility was great; accountability was slim. It also proved fl exible. 
When advocates for history, English, home economics, and other subjects com-
plained, Congress broadened NDEA in subsequent reauthorizations. Gradually, 
NDEA took on somewhat more of the look of general aid. 
 NDEA was a breakthrough politically, but it did not expand much in subsequent 
reauthorizations. It was popular with local school administrators, but the big profes-
sional lobby groups resumed their crusade for federal aid that would be more gen-
eral and more generous. More importantly, by the mid-1960s, NDEA was 
overshadowed by the seemingly sudden shift of priorities between 1958 and 1964, 
when the  Johnson administration was developing the next big education bill. It was 
focused not on the most academically talented children in the nation but on the most 
disadvantaged. The ESEA bill of 1965 became the ongoing omnibus education bill 
(Peterson  1983 , 60, 70–76, 132). 
 Desegregation 
 Brown v. Board of Education of 1954 would prove the launching pad for wide- 
ranging changes in America even though shifts in school segregation patterns would 
prove glacial at the outset. The more activist period on desegregation dovetailed 
with Lyndon Johnson’s adoption of a “ War on Poverty ” a decade after  Brown, start-
ing with the  Civil Rights Act of 1964 and setting the stage for ESEA’s Title I pro-
gram in 1965, which targeted impoverished students but also worked against 
segregation. 
 The Role of ESEA in Desegregation 
 Johnson’s sudden shift toward poverty was inspired by his ambition to achieve a 
domestic agenda surpassing his idol, President  Franklin Roosevelt . It is an intrigu-
ing connection. Roosevelt’s New Deal was constructed in the face of a collapsed 
economy, while Johnson’s  Great Society programs were made possible politically 
by a buoyant economy that raised all boats, as  James Patterson ( 1996 ) has argued. 
 Although Johnson’s advisers warned him they could not discern much support 
for poverty reform, there were some harbingers of concern for the disadvantaged. 
There was a fl urry of attention to  Michael Harrington ’s book,  The Other America: 
Poverty in the United States (1962). Also, although the  Brown decision on racial 
integration had languished in the court system for 10 years, it would prove to be a 
constitutional lodestone. More important was the rise to leadership of  Martin Luther 
King and the escalation of the  civil rights movement . 
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 The two most important legislative initiatives that applied to education on these 
two themes were  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbade discrimi-
nation in any federally funded program, and ESEA’s  Title I , which was enacted the 
next year and provided funds for compensatory reading and math education in 
schools with a high percentage of families below the poverty level. Although the 
principal aim of Title I was to improve academic achievement of low-performing 
students in high-poverty schools, it was also used in tandem with Title VI to pres-
sure school districts to eradicate racial segregation. The federal government threat-
ened to withhold Title I funding from districts found to be deliberately segregating 
their students. The long-delayed desegregation effort now became the most coercive 
intervention of the federal government into state and local systems in our history (on 
the passage of ESEA, see Sundquist  1968 along with Eidenberg and Morey  1969 ; 
on the Civil Rights Act, see Orfi eld  1969 ; Graham  1990 ). 
 Federal Action to Desegregate K-12 Education in the South 
 It is well known that very little action was taken to implement the  Brown decision 
between 1954 and 1964. In order to achieve a unanimous decision,  Earl Warren 
wrote vaguely (and famously) that the Court expected that desegregation would 
occur with “all deliberate speed.” The second  Brown decision, in 1955, addressed 
the implementation of desegregation. The Court left enforcement in the hands of the 
federal district courts in the South. Many southern states and some southern courts 
willfully misinterpreted the  Brown decision to require only that they would have to 
wipe laws that sanctioned segregation off the books. As other court decisions moved 
away from that minimalist interpretation, other southern school districts contrived 
procedures they called “freedom of choice.” It combined elaborate bureaucratic 
delays with illegal intimidation of African-Americans who asked to enroll their 
children at White schools (on the massive resistance period, see Barley  1997 ; Webb 
 2005 ; Patterson  2001 ). 
 Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act, every school district in the coun-
try, North and South, was required to fi le an affi davit with the Offi ce of Education 
stating either that no segregation was occurring in its schools or describing a plan to 
discontinue such segregation. The main targets of the Offi ce of Education were 
school systems in the 21 states that had mandatory or optional legalized segregation, 
most of which were in the Old South and border states. 
 More than 10 years after the  Brown decision, there were virtually no Black stu-
dents attending schools with White students in the Old South. Some federal judges 
supported desegregating districts, but increasingly they did not. Court orders were 
issued requiring desegregation, but the wheels of justice moved slowly. On the exec-
utive side, some federal offi cers also delayed and compromised, but increasingly, 
federal civil rights offi cers supported efforts to desegregate. Johnson kept his dis-
tance from the issue but issued occasional statements of support for the effort. 
President  Richard Nixon tried to go slow to protect his “southern strategy” for 
3 Federalism and Inequality in Education: What Can History Tell Us?
44
reelection by opposing  busing for  desegregation . But the machinery of federal 
enforcement, after more than a decade of inaction, was geared up to enforce the 
 Brown decision by 1968 when the Supreme Court declared in  Green v. Kent Co., Va . 
that  “freedom of choice” systems would not be allowed if they did not result in 
actual integration. 3 
 A profound transformation like school desegregation needed the combined 
efforts of the judiciary, the executive branch, and Congress. None of those branches 
took up the cause for the fi rst decade. Under Johnson, the weak link was Congress, 
with its potent coalition of southern segregationists and conservative Republican. 
By the end of the fi rst Nixon administration (1972) and into the  Ford administration, 
both the White House and the Congress were ambivalent or resistant to desegrega-
tion, in particular to busing. Nonetheless, major gains were made in the South in the 
years between 1968 and 1974, driven partly by some key  Supreme Court decisions, 
the efforts of local plaintiffs and civil rights organizations, and the widespread opin-
ion in favor of integration among staff lawyers at the civil rights offi ces in the 
 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the  Justice Department . 
 Although the courts were not very effective at implementation, they played an 
important role in clarifying issues and supporting the authority of the executive 
branch. The Supreme Court’s declaration against “freedom of choice” plans was 
one turning point, as was its 1973 decision in  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
(North Carolina), which insisted that busing was an appropriate remedy and was 
mandatory if other methods were inadequate. 4 At this point, many resistant southern 
districts threw in the towel and opted for at least a nominal level of integration. 
These Court decisions accelerated the most dramatic change in the entire federal 
desegregation initiative: the abrupt decrease in the percentage of African-American 
students in the Deep South and border states who were attending schools that were 
90–100 % Black. That may not capture the essence of the ideal of integration, but it 
was the government’s chief aim, and after almost 20 years of resistance, it happened 
quite rapidly. In 1968, the percentage of African-Americans in the  South attending 
overwhelmingly Black schools was 77.8 %, and by 1972, it had dropped to 24.7 %. 
Comparable fi gures for the shift from 1968 to 1972 for the other regions were as 
follows (Clotfelter  2004 ):
•  Border states : 60.2–54.7 % 
•  West : 50.8–42.7 % 
•  Midwest : 58.0–57.4 % 
•  Northeast : 42.7–46.9 % 
3  Green v. County School Board of New Kent County (North Carolina), 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
4  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (North Carolina) 402 U.S. 1 (April 20, 
1971); see also Douglas  1995 ; Wilkinson  1979 . 
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 Obstacles in the North 
 Federal efforts to desegregate school systems in the North (and West) came later 
and were less successful. The Offi ce of Education, as early as 1965, began investi-
gating four selected cities (Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Chester, PA) where 
citizens’ groups had documented school board policies that contributed to segrega-
tion, beyond the impact of housing segregation. They argued that they could address 
the issue in the North on the basis of the Civil Rights Act, even though the states 
involved did not have laws sanctioning segregation. Title VI simply says that no 
program receiving federal funds could discriminate on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin. 
 Commissioner Frank Keppel, acting on the directions of the assistant HEW sec-
retary for civil rights (with whom he disagreed), pressed the matter with the Chicago 
school board, enraging Mayor  Richard Daley . Politics trumped the Constitution. 
Daley cried “local control” and reminded Johnson that he had delivered Illinois’ 
Democratic vote for him. Keppel lost his job as commissioner. When Keppel’s 
replacement,  Harold Howe , proved to be equally energetic on desegregation, some 
former supporters of desegregation in the Congress became frustrated; they thought 
that the executive branch was becoming overly aggressive. Together with southern 
segregationists, they pressured HEW to “centralize” all civil rights matters across 
the department, removing Howe from the enforcement of desegregation. But despite 
new people in charge, the policy slowly moved forward in the South and, in a minor 
way, the North (an essential revision of the usual narrative about Keppel’s Chicago 
debacle is Miech ( n.d. ); see also Kaestle ( Forthcoming )). 
 Although northern school systems were more segregated than those in the South 
by the 1970s, four factors militated strongly against  desegregation in the North : 
fi rst, public and judicial confusion about what the term  “de facto segregation” 
meant; second, demographic trends that made it logistically diffi cult for a district 
with a high proportion of non-White students to effectively desegregate its schools; 
third, Congressional and public weariness of the coercive tactics required to move 
recalcitrant districts toward integration; and fourth, the rising opinion of American 
citizens—including many African-Americans—that busing for integration was 
wrong. This opinion was reinforced by a shift among the Black civil rights leaders 
in the generation after Martin Luther King, who eschewed integration in favor of 
better resources in their community’s schools. 
 As to the fi rst barrier, many journalists and some jurists kept alive the distinction 
that Southern desegregation was de jure (enacted in law and therefore unconstitu-
tional), while Northern desegregation was de facto, existing mostly due to housing 
patterns and thus out of reach of the  Brown decision. Of course, the  housing segre-
gation itself was the result of pervasive discrimination by landlords of rental dwell-
ings, real estate people, and developers, as well as by government agencies 
condoning “red-lining” and other discriminatory practices. Decisions within the 
education policy sector were also grossly discriminatory. Districts deepened 
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 segregation through their choice of new construction sites, determining bus routes, 
drawing attendance boundaries, and granting transfer rights. 
 In the early days of activism at the Offi ce of Education, federal offi cials relied 
upon the Civil Rights Act to attack segregation in states not covered by the  Brown 
decision. These efforts preceded by a few years the Supreme Court’s important 
decision in  Keyes v. Denver (1973). That case built upon the language and reasoning 
of various lower court judges who had declared that northern segregation caused by 
the decisions of local school boards was not de facto segregation but clearly de jure 
segregation and thus failed the test of the  14th Amendment ’s  Equal Protection 
Clause just as clearly as the laws that were struck down in the  Brown decision. 
 Keyes cemented this understanding of northern segregation among the judiciary, 
though many people continued to argue that northern segregation was different and 
beyond legal remedy (Kaestle  Forthcoming ). 
 The second barrier to northern segregation was the rising percentage of students 
of color in large cities like  Detroit and Newark. As long as desegregation enforce-
ment was restricted to single school systems rather than metropolitan areas, heavily 
White suburbs escaped involvement in the desegregation of cities that were pre-
dominantly non-White. Absent a metropolitan strategy, the prospect of busing chil-
dren of color around the city to integrate them with a small number of White children 
was neither logistically nor educationally reasonable. 
 That restriction was given the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in the Detroit 
case  Milliken v. Bradley in 1974, which declared the suburbs not culpable.  Milliken 
provided a tiny loophole to allow for metropolitan solutions, and there were subse-
quently a few such desegregation agreements reached voluntarily or with court 
encouragement, but  Milliken generally proved an effective barrier to desegregating 
large urban systems. 5 Thus, when federal courts generally recognized that northern 
segregation due to local policy decisions was  de jure segregation , the Supreme 
Court declared that school boards in governmentally separate suburbs could not be 
held responsible for segregation in the central cities they surrounded. 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court would demand clear evidence of 
intent on the part of northern school boards accused of deliberate segregation. 
Without such evidence, they lifted court supervision of those systems. 
 The third barrier to effective federal action on northern segregation was growing 
public weariness with the confl ict and a shift of opinion about its merits. In 1972, 
according to a  Newsweek poll, 58 % of White southerners favored racial integration, 
but 74 % opposed busing to achieve such integration. In the North it was 68 % in 
favor of integration and 68 % opposed to busing. When the question was framed as 
busing for integration “outside of local neighborhoods” in a Gallup poll of the early 
1970s, only 9 % of African-Americans supported it. 6 
5  Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Also see Baugh  2011 . The best book on the decline in 
desegregation efforts is Orfi eld and Eaton ( 1996 ). 
6  The percentage for Whites is from  Newsweek (March 6, 1972). The African-American results 
from a Gallup poll are reported in Frum ( 2000 , 252). 
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 Indeed, for some African-Americans, it was not simply an opposition to busing 
but disillusionment with integration itself and the feeling that it was the wrong solu-
tion. The generation of civil rights leaders that succeeded King included some 
prominent fi gures who questioned the proposition that the way to improve Black 
children’s education was to have them go to school with White children. The Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee expelled its White members and adopted a 
policy of Black Power.  Floyd McKissick , director of the Congress of Racial 
Equality, sent his children to integrated schools in Washington, D.C., where they 
had “pages torn out of books, water thrown on them in the dead of winter, ink down 
the front of their dresses.” 7 
 Other African-Americans came to think it was demeaning for policy offi cials to 
imply that their children could not learn well unless they were in school with Whites. 
This position dovetailed with the movement toward Black Power. Historian Jack 
Dougherty found that when Black leaders in  Milwaukee pressed hard for desegrega-
tion, the federal government had not yet decided what to do about northern segrega-
tion and was unresponsive. By the time federal offi cials focused on Milwaukee 
desegregation, they faced a divided Black community. Many Blacks had defected 
from integration to community control (Dougherty  2004 ). 
 Assessing the Success of Desegregation 
 Effects on School Composition  These shifts in the early and mid-1970s did not 
quash the ongoing desegregation suits and investigations of the North and South. 
There was a certain momentum behind the 10 years of activism. Many civil rights 
offi cers in the Offi ce of Education and the Justice Department still pressed on, nota-
bly  David Tatel , director of HEW’s  Offi ce of Civil Rights (OCR) , in the late 1970s. 
But in the 1980s and 1990s the landscape had very much changed. A more conser-
vative court removed court supervision of several cities despite continuing racial 
segregation, which the Court deemed to have not been caused by school board poli-
cies. The Court made it more diffi cult to document intentional discrimination and 
took the position that court supervision was not intended to go on indefi nitely. 8 The 
public and their representatives grew weary of the segregation battles. The propor-
tion of children of color increased in urban school systems, and public policy drifted 
toward compensatory education and improving inner-city schools. President  Ronald 
Reagan wanted to see less federal  civil rights enforcement , and he succeeded. 
 The extent of desegregation in the regions of the United States, and the turning 
points of trends, can be seen in Table  3.1 . The Northeast was hardly affected by the 
7  Quoted on CORE’s website, “Floyd B. McKissick: 2nd National Director of CORE,”  http://www.
core-online.org/History/mckissick.htm 
8  Missouri v. Jenkins 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public 
Schools 498 U.S. 23 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
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efforts of the federal government and other pressures to desegregate. The border 
states responded to the  Brown decision rather substantially before the big push came 
from the federal government; by 1960, 59 % were in schools with 90 % or more 
non-White students. The states of the Deep South responded in two batches. Some 
districts went along fairly quickly in the mid-1960s, reducing the absolute segrega-
tion down to a situation where 77.8 % of the South’s Black students were still in 
strongly segregated schools in 1968. In the next four years, due to the efforts of civil 
rights workers in both the waning years of the Johnson administration and the fi rst 
Nixon administration, they dramatically reduced segregation, to the point that only 
24.7 % of southern Black students were in 90 % to 100 % non-White schools. The 
Midwest and particularly the West reduced the percentage of Black students in 
strongly segregated schools, more than in the Northeast, perhaps because they were 
so much less urbanized and had relatively fewer large ghettos of African-Americans. 
(The fi gures here do not tell us about the expanding Hispanic population in the West 
and its relationship to racial isolation vis-à-vis Whites and Blacks.) Whatever the 
subtleties in the process, the West and the South had the lowest percentage of Blacks 
in schools with 90 % to 100 % minorities.
 If we look at a different criterion, the percent of Black students who were enrolled 
in schools that had 50–100 % non-White students, the regional differences are less 
stark. In all fi ve regions, somewhere between 67 % to 78 % of all African-American 
students were in majority non-White schools. The trends from 1980 to 2000 show 
modest increases in segregation on both measures considered here. Work on school 
 resegregation since 2000 supports the trend toward greater isolation. 9 
 In general, federal and state litigators have attempted to desegregate schools by 
working around housing segregation, urging busing, modifi ed attendance  boundaries, 
9  The data on Black students in majority non-White schools is also from Clotfelter ( 2004 , Table 2.1, 
56). Studies of resegregation since 2000 include Reardon et al. ( 2012 , 533–47). On racial isolation 
more generally, see Massey et al. ( 2009 ). 
 Table 3.1  Trends in desegregation, 1950–2000: percentage of Black students in 90–100 % non- 
White schools, by region 
 Region  1950 a  1960 b  1968  1972  1976  1980  1989  1999  2000 
 Northeast  –  40.0  42.7  46.9  51.4  48.7  49.8  50.2  51.2 
 Border  100  59.0  60.2  54.7  42.5  37.0  33.7  39.7  39.6 
 South  100  100  77.8  24.7  22.4  23.0  26.0  31.1  30.9 
 Midwest  53.0  56.0  58.0  57.4  51.1  43.6  40.1  45.0  46.3 
 West  –  27.0  50.8  42.7  36.3  33.7  26.7  29.9  29.5 
 U.S.  –  –  64.3  38.7  35.9  33.2  33.8  37.4  37.4 
 Source:  After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation by Clotfelter, Charles 
T. Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press in the format Book via Copyright 
Clearance Center 
 For updated fi gures, see Orfi eld et al.  2014 
 a Extrapolated from 1950–1954 
 b Extrapolated from 1960–1964 
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fair transfer policies, and other tactics. They achieved very substantial results in 
formal desegregation of schools in the Deep South and the border states. But by the 
time the courts had delegitimized the myth of de facto school segregation and fed-
eral offi cials moved to desegregate the cities of the North, the  Milliken decision 
(1974) exempted the all-White suburbs of Detroit from responsibility for segrega-
tion in the city. This withdrew the essential tool that school integrationists needed. 
Furthermore, as  Charles Clotfelter ( 2004 ) notes, in these latter years, White parents 
still retained multiple strategies to avoid integration by moving to suburbs, sending 
their children to  private schools , or enrolling them in public schools whose tracking 
systems isolated the races, all of which were legal. Combating these counter-tactics 
was beyond the reach of the legal repertoire developed in the school desegregation 
initiative. In the face of these realities, the Supreme Court retreated from racial 
integration and the public turned away from the struggles to desegregate. The cam-
paign in the North was lost. 
 The historical balance sheet on desegregation has assets and defi cits. It repudi-
ated legally segregated schools, expanded the defi nition of “legal” to cover the pol-
icy actions of local offi cials, and achieved its formal goal in the Deep South and 
border states. More children went to schools that included both Blacks and Whites. 
Despite very widespread resegregation over the past 40 years, we shall never return 
to the 100 %, school-by-school segregation that the South and border states had in 
1955. But it is not as clear a victory as the eradication of separate railroad cars or 
other public facilities. With schooling and housing, the facts on the ground display 
continuing, profound segregation, some of it still due to discrimination, some to 
economic status, some to choices made by Whites and people of color. 
 Effects on Students  The  Brown decision was the Magna Carta of desegregation. 
The decision was cited in other cases involving other venues of public life. For 
many people  Brown was the irreversible application of the Equal Protection Clause 
to deliberate segregation in American public life. But what were the consequences 
for the children who were integrated? In 2004, Clotfelter summarized his and oth-
ers’ research on some complex questions about the effects of integration. Increases 
in Black students’ academic achievement were certainly not an automatic product 
of integration. Research has documented only modest improvements in Black 
achievement in reading correlated with desegregation, and only scattered increases 
in math. On the other hand, desegregation did not typically lower scores for White 
students, a common anxiety among White people reluctant to have their children 
integrated with Black students (Ibid., 187). 
 Many people hoped that increased interracial contact would foster understanding 
and tolerance. Clotfelter reports that when schools are thoroughly desegregated—
with real opportunities for students of different races to take the same classes, par-
ticipate in clubs and sports together, and collaborate on projects—desegregation has 
often correlated with students making more friends across racial lines and express-
ing more tolerant views than students in other schools. But schools desegregated 
only through formal means left resistant Whites with many mechanisms for reseg-
regation internally. 
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 Some self-reported attitudes about race showed more tolerance and engagement 
between 1975 and 2000 despite  increased school segregation. Nationally there was 
an increase in the percentage who said they did “a lot” with students of other races, 
from about 33 % to 42 % for Black students and from 15 % to 31 % for White stu-
dents, without controlling for the racial composition of their schools. Similarly, the 
percentage of high school students who said that if they had children, it would be 
desirable if those children would have friends of another race, increased from about 
36 % to 41 % for Whites, and about 43 % to 48 % for Black students. These modest 
rises seem contrary to the increases in segregation and in any case could not demon-
strate a causal effect stemming from desegregation. If these fi ndings are technically 
valid, these more tolerant attitudes may simply illustrate that society—schools, 
media, and parents—had on average taught more children the propriety of such 
attitudes, all the while putting up with, or consciously supporting, more segregation 
(Ibid., 182). 
 All of these fi ndings are “squishy.” There is some evidence that integration done 
well—without resegregating students internally and providing a climate favorable 
for multiracial contact—can affect tolerant racial attitudes. Stated conversely, when 
Whites are segregated—school by school, within classrooms, by school tracking 
policies or by parents seeking private school attendance in predominantly White 
schools—school segregation is playing handmaiden to residential segregation in the 
United States. Together they have severe negative economic, social, and political 
consequences for African-Americans and other people of color.  Racial isolation is 
also a defi cit for Whites. 
 Some integrationists believe that school segregation is simply an offense to the 
Constitution and an indignity to those segregated, whatever the measurable results. 
But the consequences of  Brown at the ground level suggest a pyrrhic victory. Today, 
our society blends pervasive segregation with a belief that the legal issues are settled 
and thus nothing can be done about it. To those who believed in the promise of 
 Brown, this is not just frustrating but tragic.  Gary Orfi eld , a tireless advocate of 
integration, said in 1996 that our society was “sleepwalking back to  Plessy versus 
Ferguson ,” the 1896 Supreme Court case that sanctioned segregation while promis-
ing equality that was never given (Orfi eld and Eaton  1996 , Chap. 12, 331). In sum, 
 Brown and the desegregation campaign that followed 10 years later banned legally 
sanctioned discrimination and—through great effort—reduced actual segregation in 
the South and border states and in scattered areas across the North, Midwest, and 
West. 
 The Challenges of Title I: The Early Years 
 Several factors augured ill for the success of ESEA’s Title I in improving the perfor-
mance of poor students despite its enduring success politically over the decades. 
First, the alleviation of poverty was not a strong policy priority for the average 
American citizen or school superintendent. Also, there was little knowledge at the 
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federal level or within the state and local levels about how to improve the academic 
achievement of these children. Congress spent the bulk of its attention debating how 
Title I money would be allocated, not how educators could improve poor children’s 
education. 
 But Congress also did not devote much money to it. The Great Society programs 
were many in number and light on budgets. Johnson’s War on Poverty was a big 
idea, but most of its programs were in the Offi ce of Economic Opportunity, whose 
advocates fought hard to keep these programs experimental and small at fi rst. HEW 
persuaded the President to locate ESEA in the Offi ce of Education, but Congress did 
not give the resources needed to do the job. Advocates’ hopes that budget appropria-
tions would increase after the fi rst year were confounded by the expansion of the 
Vietnam War. 
 Congress not only appropriated too little money but spread it across too many 
districts. Initially the entitlement was calculated by the number of students from 
families below $2000 in family income or receiving state welfare. The latter was a 
concession to big states like New York, whose welfare payments exceeded $2000. 
However, when those numbers were tallied, that fi gure was multiplied by a factor 
refl ecting the existing per-pupil costs on average in the individual state, an induce-
ment to get the support of richer states that spent higher amounts per child on educa-
tion. Meanwhile, the initial defi nitions of poverty income levels were increased in 
order to make more attendance areas eligible. Soon, almost half the school districts 
in the country had some Title I schools. Liberal Democrats in future years would 
react to this by introducing “concentration grants,” which allocated extra funds to 
the districts with the highest proportion of poverty families. Still, the redistributive 
effect of Title I was modest. 
 Title I also foundered because many districts felt little commitment to the stated 
purpose—to improve the education of children in poverty. They simply violated the 
law and used the funds for many nonapproved purposes. Scandals emerged within a 
year.  Ruby Martin , former OCR director, and  Phyllis McClure , of the NAACP’s 
Legal Defense Fund, documented districts in which Title I funds were used to pay 
teachers and buy supplies that had nothing to do with Title I programs. Title I funds 
paid for disposal of sewage, renting an administration building, purchasing a heat-
ing system, buying buses for regular school runs, and constructing an instructional 
television studio for all students (Martin and McClure  1969 , 6, 9–11, 13, 14, 21, 
29). 10 
 Gradually, the government brought such blatant violations of rules under control, 
but more subtle problems existed. Some schools used the funds only to bring the 
expenditures for poor children up on average from the existing unequal levels to 
those of more affl uent children within a district. Federal offi cials found this “com-
parability” problem diffi cult to defi ne and monitor. Other schools used Title I funds 
to replace local or state funds even though federal offi cials emphasized that Title I 
funds must “supplement” local amounts spent on these children, not “supplant” 
those local funds. Another knotty problem has been documented by economists: 
10  Thanks to David K. Cohen and Susan L. Moffi tt for providing me with a copy of this report. 
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Adding funds in a given year may seem like an advantage to the Title I programs, 
but those gains were often offset by subsequent reductions in  local taxes for educa-
tion (Gordon  2004 ; Cascio, Gordon, and Reber  2013 ). 
 It was virtually impossible for the federal government to ascertain whether the 
funds were reaching the stated goal, which was not just to spend the money on poor 
children but reduce achievement gaps between rich and poor. Few states had regular 
statewide achievement tests, and there was an intense phobia against developing 
federal tests. People widely believed that federal tests would drive curriculum, 
which was the prerogative of localities and the states. Senator Robert Kennedy 
insisted upon an accountability clause in Title I because he believed that schools had 
no idea how to accomplish its goals. However, that clause only required districts to 
devise whatever tests they wished to use and report them annually to the state, a 
provision that was inadequate on the face of it and was, in any case, widely ignored. 11 
As we shall see, important reforms were made in education legislation, and in Title 
I in particular, in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 New Equity Issues Emerge in the 1970s 
 Four important  equity issues emerged in the 1970s—an effort to have the federal 
government encourage  equalization of local-per pupil expenditures , which ema-
nated from the Nixon White House and a Presidential Commission—and three oth-
ers initiated by members of Congress working with citizens advocacy groups: 
improving opportunities for  English language learners ,  women , and  children with 
disabilities . 
 Nixon Seeks to Equalize Expenditures 
 Before moving ahead to the 1980s, it is worth looking at the issue of school fi nance 
reform, which blossomed as an issue early in the Nixon administration. Several dif-
ferent forces led to the establishment of a presidential task force on school fi nance. 
The administration had become interested in equalizing resources across districts, 
partly because they were so unequal but also because the administration had become 
committed to the improvement of inner-city schools as an alternative to extensive 
busing for desegregation. 
 The California Supreme Court had issued a decision requiring equalization of 
school resources in that state, but the school board in San Antonio, Texas, was 
11  On the debates and passage of ESEA, see Sundquist ( 1968 ) and Eidenberg and Morey ( 1969 ). 
For critical perspectives on its weaknesses, see Jeffrey ( 1978 ) , and especially Cohen and Moffi tt 
( 2009 ), which emphasizes the paucity of educational resources at all levels and the loose policy 
levers in the federal system of educational governance. 
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 challenging such equalization just as the  President’s Commission on School Finance 
began its work. In its fi nal report, the commission recommended a shift to full fund-
ing of education by the state. Districts would be allowed to raise up to 10 % of the 
state allocation as a supplement and retain all authority over the spending of the 
district’s entire allocation. In allocating money to districts, the state would consider 
criteria that included “differentials based on educational need, such as the increased 
costs of educating the handicapped and disadvantaged.” The federal government 
would offer grants to states as an incentive for states to gradually shift to full  state 
funding of schools and to “more nearly equalize resources among the States for 
elementary and secondary education.” 
 The commission urged states to help local communities to offer  early childhood 
education to children over 4 years old, and it urged state and local offi cials to reor-
ganize districts to balance resources and favor a diversity of racial and economic 
background. The national interest, said the commission, included concentrating 
funds for low-income children, emergency school assistance for districts develop-
ing a more heterogeneous student body, and revenue sharing to states for special 
education (President’s Commission on School Finance  1972 ). 
 Some of these goals had been around for some years, but the most radical and 
central policy shift, to full state funding, found no takers in the Congress. And in the 
 Rodríguez v. San Antonio decision, the Supreme Court (in a 5–4 majority) declared 
that the San Antonio Board of Education had not violated students’ rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Equal expenditures in education, 
they said, was not a constitutional right. That did not preclude states or the federal 
government from taking steps to equalize per pupil resources voluntarily, but it put 
a halt to claims that the U.S. Constitution required it. The establishment of this bar-
rier led many civil rights attorneys to pursue suits calling for equalization of 
resources within individual states, no longer arguing on the basis of the 
U.S. Constitution but on the explicit or implied rights of students based on state 
constitutions and laws. For this important and complex story, see Chap.  4 . 
 Bilingual Education 
 The history of  bilingual education is complex, with mixtures of tolerance and oppo-
sition, all the way back to British colonial America. Most states, however, gradually 
suppressed instruction in the native languages of English language learners. The 
League of United Latin American Citizens preached an assimilationist message but 
also promoted Hispanic cultural affairs and, more importantly, argued against the 
segregation and inferior treatment of Hispanic students from the 1920s through the 
1960s. Indeed, the federal court decision in  Méndez (1946) disallowed segregation 
of Spanish-speaking students. Loopholes allowing segregation for “educational” 
reasons kept this declaration from meaningful implementation, but it was widely 
considered as a precedent for the  Brown decision. By the late 1960s bilingual educa-
tion and desegregation became the twin aims of Hispanic activists. Senator Ralph 
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Yarborough of Texas introduced a small, optional program to support English lan-
guage learners. It became  Title VII of the reauthorized ESEA in 1968. It passed 
without much support from Johnson, who did not like his fellow Texan and was 
preoccupied with the heavy fi nancial burden of the Vietnam War. 
 These small beginnings for bilingual education coincided with the rise of the 
 Chicano Movement , emanating mostly from the Southwest. Unlike earlier Mexican- 
American school reformers who focused on segregation and poor facilities, the 
Chicano organizations supported cultural reform of the school curriculum and the 
proud advancement of Chicano identity in all aspects of life. In strikes and protests 
in 1968 and later, Chicano leaders, including many high school students, demanded 
more bilingual teachers, more Hispanic counselors, and more respect for Chicano 
culture. 
 These ideas had some hold in Anglo politicians’ circles. President John 
F. Kennedy’s  Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity released a report in 
1963 declaring that the schools should have a curriculum that would “refl ect Spanish 
as well as American traditions, and should hire teachers in both cultures.” When the 
Nixon administration took offi ce in 1969, he supported bilingual education, partly 
because he saw Hispanic votes in the offi ng, partly because he enjoyed supporting 
something that Johnson had not supported, and partly because he wanted to be seen 
as an innovator. OCR Director  Stanley  Pottinger was more liberal than Nixon was 
on most issues, and he sensed a green light on bilingual education. He issued a star-
tling memo in 1970 arguing that because Title VI of the Civil Rights Act banned 
discrimination in any federal program, including discrimination against students on 
the basis of national origin, it actually required a curriculum that refl ected students’ 
language and culture. Pottinger did not have the resources to enforce such an opin-
ion, and he did not insist that bilingual education per se was required. Still, the OCR 
memo sent a strong federal message (Pottinger  1970 ; on Hispanic struggles for 
more treatment, see Moreno  1999 ; San Miguel  1987 ;  2004 ; Strum  2010 ; Davies 
 2007 , Chap. 6). 
 By now bilingual education was being advocated around the country. A strong 
bill passed in Massachusetts, and in the courts, a case called  Lau v. Nichols was test-
ing the language rights of non-English speaking students in San Francisco. Upon 
reaching the Supreme Court, the justices, in a unanimous decision, based their 
endorsement of students’ language rights on the Civil Rights Act and Pottinger’s 
memorandum. They declared “there is no equality of treatment merely by providing 
students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers and curriculum” because “stu-
dents who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaning-
ful education.” Like Pottinger’s memo, the Court decision (1974) did not require 
bilingual education but insisted that all school systems had a responsibility to 
accommodate the learning needs of English language learners. However, when 
OCR issued a set of strong guidelines called the “ Lau Remedies ,” the following 
summer, bilingual education was strongly favored. 12 
12  Lau v. Nichols 414 U.S. 563 (1974); U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Offi ce 
of Civil Rights  1975 , Appendix B. 
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 This preference for bilingual education refl ected Congressional action in the 
 Bilingual Education Act of 1974 . Spearheaded by  Ted Kennedy and Alan Cranston 
in the Senate, it endorsed the primacy of bilingual education with a bilingual- 
bicultural approach. This was the apex of the reigning but fragile view of language 
rights and cultural pluralism. By the end of the decade, scores of dissenting reports 
and opinions had been registered. 
 The lasting effect of the Bilingual Education Act of 1974 was to confi rm that 
accommodating students’ English language learning was now mandatory. It also 
implied that bilingual education was not just a preferred but a necessary response to 
 Lau . Finally, the act provided substantially more support for technical assistance 
and grants for research and development ($68 million, about 10 times that of the 
Bilingual Act of 1968) (Schneider  1976 ; Stewner-Manzanares  1988 ). 
 Although bilingual education remained the predominant pedagogy for meeting 
English learners’ language needs, there was a surge of negative criticism in the late 
1970s and the 1980s. Many critics did not agree that bilingual education was supe-
rior to other techniques. Others launched philosophical salvos against accommodat-
ing the languages of non-English speakers. Some researchers pointed out the 
problems in “transitional” bilingual programs, which required subtle judgments 
about when a student should be transferred to regular English-speaking classes. In 
some cases, bilingual programs became isolated, and some children stayed in them 
longer than was effective for gaining content knowledge. 
 In the 1980s, a conservative President Reagan and a mixed Congress passed vari-
ous bilingual education laws that prescribed what percentage of programs had to be 
bilingual and how many could be allowed through other pedagogies. The road 
beyond 1992 was mixed. Bilingual education had many critics but survived except 
in a few states that passed anti-bilingual legislation. 
 Many authorities in the 1970s argued that equal opportunity would not be 
achieved unless children, Hispanic and those of other national origins, could see 
their cultures refl ected in the schools’ curriculum. Though some Hispanic commen-
tators have criticized bilingual programs, many others still believe in the ideal of 
 bilingual-bicultural education in a pluralistic school environment. That hope was 
politically fragile, but there is no doubt that many public schools installed bilingual 
education programs, and some introduced a more pluralistic curriculum. The bilin-
gual education movement, however fl awed in some eyes, did move us in a more 
equal direction. A federal program that began modestly, with a small grants pro-
gram, became obligatory by a sweeping but ambiguous Supreme Court decision. 
 Title IX Bars Discrimination Against Women 
 A second problem that received heightened attention in the 1970s was discrimina-
tion against women.  Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments forbade such 
discrimination in all federally funded education programs. Its effect in education 
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was to add women to the list of groups already protected by the Civil Rights Act, 
which banned discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. 
 Title IX received no opposition from the Nixon White House and enjoyed bipar-
tisan support in the Congress. Some have thought that its quiet acceptance is myste-
rious, because it promised numerous changes in the traditional practices of schools 
and colleges. There were several reasons for this relatively easy passage. The wom-
en’s movement, despite some setbacks, had laid the groundwork for wide publicity 
and considerable support for women’s rights by 1971. The Congress and the White 
House were focusing their most energetic debates on busing for desegregation. 
After the bill’s passage as the Education Amendments of 1972, when more politi-
cians realized the implications of the law, there was much debate surrounding the 
drafting of regulations that would bring the brief language of Title IX to life. Most 
attention was focused on college admissions and school and college athletics. 
Compromises were made on undergraduate admissions, including exemption for 
single-sex colleges and on other matters, with HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger 
in charge. 
 The regulations did not appear until 1975. When they appeared, OCR was under-
staffed and ill prepared to respond to complaints. Education Commissioner  Terrel 
Bell fretted privately about the impact of Title IX enforcement on local control. 
Weinberger was succeeded by Forrest David Mathews, who disliked bureaucracy 
and was opposed to a strong federal policy role in education. Thus the implementa-
tion of Title IX had barely begun when the administration of Democrat  Jimmy 
Carter began in January 1977. Tatel, the OCR director, furthered the implementa-
tion of Title IX along with ongoing desegregation work. However, federal  civil 
rights enforcement declined under the Reagan administration (Salomone  1986 ). 
 Nonetheless, Title IX had secured a permanent future, and some important poli-
cies and procedures were developed by the 1980s. All colleges and universities 
receiving federal aid were required to establish clear procedures for charges of  sex-
ual harassment . They were prominently posted and, in some cases, worked well. 
The dominance of women’s athletics in discussions of Title IX has overshadowed 
equally important issues pertaining to access,  discrimination , and  sexual miscon-
duct . All were important. Other issues received detailed attention from OCR, 
including gender balance among fi nalists for faculty positions (Ibid., as well as per-
sonal recollection of the author). 
 Assessing the success of Title IX is diffi cult. How much progress has been due 
to Title IX and how much to changing acceptance of women’s capacities and rights? 
If there has been progress, what shall we make of continuing, endemic sexist behav-
ior at the college level—from derogatory attitudes about women at prestigious grad-
uate schools to an apparent epidemic of date rape at the college level? Title IX 
obviously still has a role to play in curbing these acts of discrimination and vio-
lence. Is the glass half full or half empty? Although uniform treatment and full 
equality of status still eludes us, there has been progress in increasing the propor-
tions of women Ph.D. recipients in fi elds that were until recently male dominated, 
C. Kaestle
57
as well as rising percentages of women among college faculty and college 
presidents. 13 
 Education of Children with Disabilities 
 In the nineteenth century, almost no students with disabilities went to public schools. 
Most remained with their families, segregated from schools of any kind. Among 
those in institutions that were educational and not merely custodial, the emphasis 
was on blind and deaf children. In the cases of what were then called “mentally 
retarded,” emotionally disturbed, or hyperactive children, some were committed to 
asylums where inmates were vaguely defi ned as “troublesome,” “imbecilic,” “incor-
rigible,” or “truant.” Toward the end of the nineteenth century many of these  institu-
tions adopted eugenic explanations of  disabilities . Involuntary sterilizations were 
carried out on a large scale. As numbers swelled in these institutions, overcrowding, 
physical punishments, sexual assaults by staff, and physical restraints on the inmates 
occurred. Scandals caused little public concern until the 1970s. During the subse-
quent 20 years many were exposed and closed down. 
 A few outstanding institutions for children with disabilities in both the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries developed educational methods and did other research 
in the fi eld. In 1957, Governor Orville Faubus of Arkansas hired an able expert, 
David Ray, to direct the Arkansas Children’s Colony. Ray lectured widely on the 
need to have such children going to public schools. He later became an adviser to 
 Eunice Shriver , President Kennedy’s sister, who lobbied for better government sup-
port for children with disabilities. Some states passed legislation requiring schools 
to admit some such students, but progress was slow. The Massachusetts law of 1972 
would become a model for later federal action. 
 Two court cases helped publicize the issue and supported parents’ claims that 
their children’s civil rights were being violated. Members of the  Pennsylvania 
Association for Retarded Citizens (PARC) claimed in 1971 that the state had vio-
lated the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause when it allowed schools to 
reject admission to any child without at least a “mental age of fi ve.” Because state 
offi cials admitted that the law was wrong, the trial resulted in a consent decree, not 
a full-blown opinion. The three-judge panel simply said these children’s rights had 
been violated and did not elaborate on the constitutional arguments. Expert wit-
nesses had presented evidence that children with learning disabilities could benefi t 
13  I am not aware of a comprehensive published history of Title IX, thus McCarthy ( 1991 ) is impor-
tant. Ware ( 2007 ) organizes relevant documents. Other relevant works are Fishel and Pottker 
( 1977 , Chap. 5), which addresses the development of regulations for Title IX, and Costain ( 1979 , 
3–11). 
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from the services of a free public school system. The Court directed Pennsylvania 
to expunge from its state code any barriers to the enrollment of these children. 14 
 The  PARC decision addressed children with intellectual disabilities but not those 
with other disabilities. One year later, suit was brought against the Board of 
Education of Washington, D.C. The fi rst named plaintiff, 12-year-old  Peter Mills , 
was expelled from fourth grade in a district elementary school as a “behavior prob-
lem.” The District did not afford him a proper hearing or allow him to enroll in any 
other public school. The following year. D.C. authorities incarcerated Peter at 
“Junior Village,” and the parents brought suit. Sketches of the other six plaintiffs 
showed similar histories. U.S. District  Judge Joseph Cornelius Waddy ruled that the 
plaintiffs and all children with disabilities had rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause and could not be excluded from the public schools. School offi cials argued 
that it would be prohibitively expensive; Waddy disagreed. He ordered the District 
to “provide to each child of school age a free and suitable publicly-supported educa-
tion regardless of the degree of the child’s mental, physical, or emotional disability 
or impairment.” 15 
 These cases stood as the legal landmarks of the education rights of children with 
disabilities. Nonetheless, some advocates were nervous that the upcoming trial in 
 Rodríguez v. San Antonio might end with a denial of education as a right under the 
14th Amendment. They campaigned instead for an endorsement of these rights 
under the Civil Rights Act. 
 This effort succeeded in the form of a one-sentence amendment to the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 known as  Section 504 . Modeled on the Civil Rights Act, 
it states: “No otherwise qualifi ed handicapped individual in the United States . . . 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefi ts of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal fi nancial assistance.” Young civil rights staff of Senator 
 Harrison Williams (D-New Jersey) drafted this legislation. Their instincts about 
 Rodríguez proved justifi ed. In 1974 the Supreme Court declared, in a 5–4 decision, 
that the Constitution did not support a right to education. Nonetheless, Section 504 
preserved the mantle of civil rights that surrounded special education. Like Title IX 
for women’s education in 1972, Section 504 did not cause great controversy as a 
simple abstract statement because it was nestled in a bill full of specifi c require-
ments and programs (see Scotch  2001 , 47–48). 
 The stage was now set for a comprehensive federal bill supporting  special educa-
tion .  Mills and  PARC were being widely cited. Many states were facing lawsuits on 
their basis. Other states were moving ahead voluntarily on these new responsibili-
ties. In May 1973, the  Washington Post estimated that there were about 7 million 
children with disabilities in the country. Of these, approximately 2.8 million were in 
public schools with special education services, a big rise from the 1960s. One mil-
lion were excluded from public schools and were not in private schools. A half 
14  Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 334 F. Supp. 
1257, U.S. Dist. (1971). 
15  Peter Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia , 348 F. Supp. 866 (1972). 
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 million were in private institutions, many receiving no education. Finally, about 2.7 
million children with disabilities were in schools where they received no special 
education. States were already alarmed at the costs, and tensions were arising about 
the relative share to be provided by the district, state, and federal levels. 16 
 Williams’ comprehensive  Education of All Handicapped Children Act was 
debated in 1974 and passed in 1975. It had several main provisions. First, each child 
with a disability would have an  individual education plan (IEP) . Second, schools 
were directed to conduct education of the children with disabilities in the  “least 
restrictive” environment , that is, in regular classrooms, to the extent feasible. This 
provision later became known informally as “ mainstreaming .” It was founded on 
the belief that children with disabilities as well as those without disabilities would 
benefi t from daily contact and a normalization of relationships as well as access to 
the regular curriculum. However, it also brought tensions from teachers who 
believed that attention to children with disabilities detracted from paying attention 
to the other students and that some of these children were disruptive. Teachers also 
argued they were not trained to handle these responsibilities. 
 To get funds from this law, districts were required to submit a plan for appropri-
ate education of all of their children with disabilities. Even if they declined funds 
from Williams’ act, they were required to accommodate all children with disabili-
ties because discrimination was forbidden by the Rehabilitation Act. The federal 
government proposed to fund the states for as much as 40 % of the “extra” costs of 
special education (translating into about 20 % of the total costs of the average spe-
cial education student). However, federal appropriations were actually much lower 
than 40 % (see Table  3.2 ). This shortfall led the hard-pressed states to complain that 
the law was an “unfunded mandate,” but the authority of the federal government 
held steady: The obligation of the states was based on civil rights, regardless of 
federal funding.
16  Bart Barnes and Andrew Barnes, “Special Education: A New Storm Center,”  Washington Post, 
May 29, 1973, C1; B. Barnes and A. Barnes, “Handicapped Pupils Face Schooling Crisis,” 
 Washington Post, May 30, 1974, D1. The Barnes’s estimates of numbers of children with disabili-
ties and their schooling categories came from Alan R. Abeson, spokesman for the Council for 
Exceptional Children. 
 Table 3.2  Funding of special education costs, percent shares, 1983 through 2010 
 Date  Federal  State  Local 
 1983  7  56  37 
 1988  6  58  36 
 1994  6  55  39 
 1999  8  47  45 
 2010  9  47  44 
 Sources: Parrish  2001 , 4–12, Table 4; 2010 data from Baker et al.  2014 
 For end-of-the-century information, see New America Foundation ( n.d ). For a good discussion of 
these and other fi gures about relative share and real costs, see Aron and Loprest ( 2012 , 110) 
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 The regulations for the act were not formulated until nearly the end of President 
Gerald Ford’s term. As with the Title IX regulations, implementation was delayed. 
The Carter administration took offi ce in January, but the special education regula-
tions went through a further lengthy consideration and appeared in the summer of 
1977. By this time, special education had become an expanding item in school 
budgets, with the states and districts bearing most of the costs and straining under 
the imperatives of the law. There were also debates about mainstreaming; discipline 
with children with disabilities; whether severely disabled children should be main-
streamed; the overdiagnosis of disability for children of color; and other issues. 
Still, special education legislation had (and has) broad bipartisan appeal. 
 The rising percentage of students with disabilities among the total student popu-
lation was substantial. The percentage of school students in special education in 
1977 was 8.3 %; by 2005 it was 13.8 % (U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics  2015a ). During that time the federal share of costs 
remained about level, while the state share decreased and the local share increased 
(see Table  3.2 ). It is this expanding percentage of students in special education, not 
rising costs per pupil, that has made special education the fastest growing budget 
item in most local districts. It arose over the past 50 years, starting from a situation 
in which only a tiny minority of children with disabilities were in public schools at 
all, to today, when it is a permanent and large reality in our schools. This develop-
ment involved all three levels of the federalist system and all three branches, but it 
was led by federal courts and its advocates in the Congress, both pressed by interest 
groups of special education parents and special education professionals. Whatever 
its fl aws, it was a historic shift, and, for the most part, a benefi t to children with 
disabilities. 
 Another reform initiative addressed the profound discrimination experienced by 
 Native Americans , but space allows only brief mention. These developments in 
policy governing Native American education, including the  Indian Education Act of 
1972 , contributed to equalization of opportunity by recognizing Native Americans’ 
justifi ed desire for more autonomy in governing their educational institutions and 
having a genuine voice on commissions and in the newly created Offi ce of Indian 
Education (for the history of education policy regarding Native Americans, see 
Szasz  1999 ; Hale  2002 ). 
 The 1978 Reauthorization of ESEA 
 Advocates and opponents of bilingual education, women’s equity in education, and 
education for children with disabilities continued working through the complicated 
process of implementation, the approval of regulations and guidelines, and provid-
ing the relevant agencies with the needed resources to make a federal program work. 
In the meantime, the Democrats returned to the White House. President Carter had 
many problems on his hands, and in education, he was mostly preoccupied with 
creating a new  Department of Education . Meanwhile, veteran staff at the Offi ce of 
C. Kaestle
61
Education and in Congressional education committees carried on the development 
of a revised ESEA. 
 The impetus for a Department of Education arose during the 1976 election cam-
paign, when Carter courted the  National Education Association ’s support; in the 
process he agreed to support its longtime goal of creating a separate department 
with Cabinet status. Carter eventually focused on the promised department and 
gathered various West Wing staff to work on details, especially the issue of which 
federal programs would be transferred to it from other agencies. 
 Meanwhile, the reauthorization of ESEA loomed important. Much of the leader-
ship for the reauthorization came from  Marshall “Mike”  Smith , assistant commis-
sioner of education for policy. Smith was a veteran of ESEA purposes, policies, and 
problems and a veteran Offi ce of Education offi cial. The commissioner, Ernest 
Boyer, former chancellor of the State University of New York, advocated in 
Congress for ESEA along with HEW Secretary  Anthony (Joe) Califano . But Boyer 
was otherwise mostly involved in the disputes about what programs should be in the 
new Department of Education, while Califano openly opposed losing the Offi ce of 
Education, which he thought belonged in an organization that combined education 
with health and welfare matters. 
 Smith and his colleagues developed the Offi ce of Education’s proposed ESEA 
legislation and conferred with Congressional staff continually. Among the key 
House staff were  Jack Jennings and  Chris Cross. Jennings, a Democrat, was major-
ity counsel to the House Subcommittee on Elementary and Secondary Education, 
and Cross, a Republican, was minority senior staff member. They worked well with 
each other and with Smith. A lengthy document emerged, went to the President for 
approval, and then went to the relevant Congressional committees for further 
negotiations. 
 Evaluations of Title I in the early 1970s had discovered widespread misuse of 
funds, questioned whether the funds were properly targeted at kids in high-poverty 
schools, and saw little evidence that the programs were working to improve aca-
demic achievement (McLaughlin  1975 ; Vinovskis  1999a ). In response, Congress in 
1974 commissioned a three-year study headed by  Paul Hill at the new National 
Institute of Education (NIE). The legislative report by the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Education and Labor, when introducing the 1978 bill, stated that the 
 NIE study had convinced them that the funds were now effectively targeted, explain-
ing that while Title I provided only 5 % of the elementary and secondary education 
budgets nationwide, many poor districts reported levels up to 17 %. As for results, 
NIE found that Title I students tended not to fall behind their “non-assisted peers.” 
Part of the NIE research was a case study of 12 districts, which showed much better 
academic gains than in previous evaluations. Carl Perkins, chair of the Education 
Committee, concluded, “Title I has matured into a viable approach for aiding the 
disadvantaged.” 17 
17  HR. Rep. No. 29-553 at 6-7. (Excerpt of a Report on the Education Amendments of 1978). 
Available online through HathiTrust at  http://www.hathitrust.org/access 
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 The committee’s optimistic report would not end criticisms of Title I’s effi ciency 
in raising students’ scores. In fact, another study was ongoing at the same time. 
Called the  “Sustaining Effects” study , it followed 130,000 students in 300 schools 
for three years. Study director  Launor Carter pointed out the participation problems: 
Many poor children were in non-Title I schools that did not qualify as having a suf-
fi cient concentration of poor families. Conversely, many low-achieving students 
who were in Title I schools but were not economically disadvantaged were in Title 
I instructional programs. Furthermore, students with very low achievement levels 
got little benefi t from Title I; those with somewhat higher achievement at the begin-
ning benefi ted the most. These and other qualms caused Carter to say that Title I 
was not “a unifi ed or coherent treatment program” and needed a “new program with 
more intensive and innovative techniques” to bring success to the lowest achieving 
students (Carter  1984 ). 
 The Offi ce of Education staff, in consultation with education experts in Congress, 
came up with several substantial reforms for the 1978 authorization, working mainly 
with Congress but giving regular reports to the White House staff and getting their 
ideas vetted and approved by the Offi ce of Management and Budget. Among these 
changes were allocating a higher per-pupil expenditure to Title I students in schools 
with a large concentration of high-poverty families (which Congress set at 55 %); 
pressing Title I programs to rely less upon “pullout” programs and to integrate Title 
I students into regular classrooms with special assistance; allowing schools with 
75 % or more percentage of children from homes below the poverty line to spend 
Title I funds on “whole school” programs and improvements; providing matching 
funds to states that had put money into their own  compensatory education pro-
grams ; providing better  professional development for experienced teachers in the 
fi eld; engaging in better planning and development of bilingual education; encour-
aging states to equalize resources among districts; deepening parental participation 
by requiring districts to pay for their transportation to and from meetings; and 
requiring districts to submit plans about the training of parent council members. 
 Beyond Title I, the 1978 Amendments had several other titles related to equal 
opportunity:  Title II for basic skills improvement ,  Title VI for “emergency aid” to 
desegregating schools , Title VII for bilingual education, Title IX for women’s edu-
cation equity, and Title XI for Indian education. 18 The collaboration and constant 
communication between Offi ce of Education staff and key Congressional advocates 
was crucial in producing a reauthorization bill with bipartisan support. 
18  Education Amendments of 1978, 92 Stat. 2143 (Washington, D.C.: Public Law 95-561, 95th 
Cong (1978); interview with Marshall Smith, September 24, 2013; Cross ( 2014 , 70–74); Jennings 
( 2015 , 35–42). 
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 Education Policy and Civil Rights in the Reagan 
Administration 
 Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980 over Carter on a platform that focused largely 
on cutting down on “big government.” In the fi eld of education, the  Education 
Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA) of 1981 moved to  decentralize and 
 deregulate the federal role in education while spending less on federal aid. Its major 
sections were now called “chapters” rather than “titles.” Chapter I became the new 
name for Title I for compensatory education of disadvantaged students in schools 
with high poverty. Education for children with disabilities also continued in sepa-
rate legislation. But  Chapter II of ECIA was a showcase innovation: a  “block” grant . 
It pulled together 32 small federal programs. The items blocked in Chapter II ranged 
from the Emergency Schools Assistance Act (ESAA) for desegregation costs, to 
metric education, environmental education, and other small programs. The states 
received their share purely on the basis of population and were required to allocate 
at least 80 % of it directly to districts. Districts were then permitted to allocate the 
Chapter II funds as they wished among the 32 programs. 
 This devolution of control came at a time when state and local budgets were 
tight, and the ECIA bill itself reduced allocations for many programs. There was 
less money for both Chapter I and Chapter II (in comparison to its 32 constituent 
programs separately) than had been the case a year before, so the states and districts 
had to make their decisions about Chapter II allocations in the midst of a funding 
crisis. Furthermore, Chapter II had a much smaller budget than Chapter I. In many 
districts, these 32 programs had added up to as little as 1 % of the elementary and 
secondary school costs, although ranging upward in large city districts that had 
many more families in poverty and many remaining desegregation activities. 
 A strong shift of money from urban to suburban and rural, and a shift away from 
desegregation, resulted from the funding changes. Previously a large share of the 
funds represented by these 32 separate programs had gone to large urban districts—
partly because ESAA was the largest program in the block, and partly because 
urban school staffs were more likely to apply successfully for grants. But Chapter II 
funds required no application. The money came just on the basis of school 
population. 
 The shift can be seen in these fi gures: Wilmington, DE, received $3.3 million just 
from ESAA the year before the block funding; under ECIA, the amount of block 
funds for all Chapter II purposes the next year was only $1.7 million. St. Louis and 
Kansas City received $7.0 million between them under ESAA; the next year the 
entire state of Missouri received $8.7 million for Chapter II overall (Verstegen  1985 , 
521). Another study showed that 20 urban school districts, including Atlanta, 
Buffalo, Boston, Chicago, and New York, collectively received $110 million from 
the ESAA alone in 1980; the next year, they collectively received $38 million for all 
the programs combined in the block grant (Salomone  1986 , 179). Despite the over-
all reduction in ECIA funds, and perhaps because of the shift from urban districts, 
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school offi cials in many rural and suburban districts praised ECIA as a modest 
return to local control, as it was intended to be (Turnbull and Marks  1986 , 61, 63). 
 The Reagan administration proposed large cuts in other education programs. 
Education advocates in Congress strained against it, settling for budgets larger than 
the White House proposed but less than many had wished. Within these small 
annual increases, some of the fl agship programs of the 1960s and 1970s were 
reduced. Rosemary Salomone writes that between 1980 and 1984, federal funding 
cuts, adjusted for infl ation, were as follows: 9.3 % for special education, 19.7 % for 
compensatory education for disadvantaged students; and 39.8 % for bilingual edu-
cation (Salomone  1986 , 180). 
 In addition to the shift of priorities in the small block grants—which worked 
disproportionately against desegregation aid—and targeted cuts in programs for 
compensatory education, bilingual education, and special education, there was also 
a slowdown of enforcement in civil rights suits. This was part of the Reagan plat-
form to transfer authority in education to the states and districts. One of the effects 
of this philosophy was to diminish federal programs that had been intended to 
increase opportunity. 19 Overall, this was the last period when the federal portion of 
funding diminished. 
 The Nation at Risk Report 
 While federal funding was on the decline, a broad-based push for education reform 
was on the way. President Reagan’s Secretary of Education was Terrel Bell, a vet-
eran education leader from Utah who had served as U.S. Commissioner of Education 
during the Ford administration. He may have been the most liberal member of the 
Reagan cabinet, but he was a strong believer in local control. He had advised 
President Ford to veto the special education legislation in 1975 because he thought 
it was too costly and intrusive (Bell  1975 ). Bell had little stature with the President, 
but he was convinced that America’s schools needed reforming, and he asked the 
White House to appoint a blue-ribbon commission to look into it. When the White 
House ignored his request, Bell appointed a department commission on his own 
authority. 
 The National Commission on Excellence in Education worked with data from 
researchers at the Education Department, who provided tons of information on the 
good news and bad news about schools in the U.S. However, two of the scientists on 
the panel, Gerald Horton, a physicist from Harvard, and Glenn Seaborg, a chemist 
19  I do not have data on expenses specifi cally for Title IX, which bars discrimination against 
women, as a part of the budget of the Offi ce of Civil Rights in HEW. Salomone ( 1986 , 180) reports 
that enforcement of Title IX was reduced during the Reagan administration, and that the Reagan 
administration tried to either block grant or zero budget the Women’s Educational Equity Act, 
which complemented Title IX by providing funds to promote sex equity and eliminate sex-stereo-
typing in education materials. Women’s advocacy groups succeeded in lobbying, and he signed a 
fi ve-year extension of the program in 1984. 
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at Berkeley, were not satisfi ed with the initial staff draft. Horton wanted something 
more decisive. He and other members crafted a theme of crisis, which framed the 
research data around alarming trends and gave them a slogan:  A Nation at Risk . 
Journalists picked up on this eagerly. There was already much publicity about poor 
test results and their possible relation to America’s competitive position in the 
world.  Nation at Risk fanned the fi res. The Department of Education counted 700 
newspaper articles about the report in the fi rst four months after its publication. 
Reagan met to congratulate the members. A side effect of this highly publicized 
report was that it weakened public and Congressional sentiment to abolish the 
Education Department (Vinovskis  2009 ). 
 However, it did not change the determination of the Reagan administration to 
back away from a federal role in education. In response to a President who said that 
education was the states’ business and a federal report that said there was an urgent 
crisis, offi cials in the states took up the slack. It led to a decade of reform activity, 
resulting in new legislation in most states and capacity building in the state educa-
tion agencies. The theme was excellence; the goal was to raise average test scores, 
not necessarily to reduce the gap between some groups and others. 
 The commission, along with several other reform reports, recommended more 
homework, higher  graduation standards , more academic focus in schools, and better 
teacher preparation. Many states passed laws incorporating these recommendations. 
However, within three or four years, journalists and educators were bemoaning the 
failure of these reforms to increase test scores. The reform movement was fading. 
Its theory of action, plausible enough, was that if kids worked hard enough, and if 
 teacher-training  programs raised their standards, academic achievement would rise. 
However, that strategy did not work in the short run. By 1985 the National 
Governors’ Association was calling for better testing and task forces to recommend 
better reforms. 
 Reagan Faces Reversals: Hawkins-Stafford Bill of 1988 
 In the waning years of Reagan’s second term, Congress reversed some of his poli-
cies on education. This effort was led by Augustus “Gus” Hawkins, Democratic 
Congressman from Los Angeles and chair of the House Committee on Education 
and Labor, and his co-sponsor, Robert Stafford, a renegade Vermont Republican 
who believed in a strong federal role in education. Their bill deleted the signature 
provision of ECIA, the block grants under Chapter II.  Hawkins-Stafford increased 
Chapter I spending staunchly but required the states to make gains on achievement 
and narrowing gaps. Any state that did not make its target two years in a row was 
required to review its districts’ programs and supervise remediation. Equalization 
was the goal; tighter monitoring of test scores was the strategy. 
 The bill also strengthened the role of the  National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP) by establishing an independent governing body, the National 
Assessment Governing Board, to set goals for what students should know and be 
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able to do at various grade levels in various subjects. The new ESEA was not a pana-
cea, however. The federal government still yielded to the states the job of setting 
performance standards, and there was great variability in how ambitious the goals 
were in different states. Nonetheless, as Jennings emphasizes, the emphasis in the 
Hawkins-Stafford amendments on accountability was a strong factor in the almost 
unanimous bipartisan support for the bill; also, the emphasis on standards helped 
lay the groundwork for the standards movement as the basis for school reform and 
 accountability . 20 
 The Era of Standards-Based Reform 
 George H. W. Bush and the Onset of Reform 
 As President Reagan’s second term ended and  George H. W. Bush was elected 
President, the country was looking for new answers to improve education. President 
Bush hoped to launch a partnership between the federal government and the states, 
but a Democratic majority in Congress short-circuited his legislative efforts. 
Meanwhile, the cadre of “education” governors was growing, and they began to 
edge toward the use of comparative state test results to spur reform. NAEP had 
launched an experimental state-by-state administration of the tests, which had the 
potential to rate states across the nation. Also, independent state-produced tests 
could be rated relative to the uniform NAEP assessments (Vinovskis  2008 ,  2009 ). 
 After his election Bush suggested a national education summit meeting, to which 
the governors readily agreed. Held in September 1989, the Charlottesville (Va.) 
Summit ended with the governors and the President agreeing to improve assessment 
and accountability. They also called for a set of national goals in education. Prior to 
the meeting, Governors  Bill Clinton of Arkansas (Dem.) and Carroll Campbell of 
South Carolina (Rep.) co-chaired a meeting in which they noted the disadvantages 
of students of color and students from low-income families.  Equality of opportunity 
had reentered the picture. 
 After the summit, the governors and the White House agreed upon six goals, 
several of which had strong implications for equal opportunity and equalization of 
results. The goals stated that by the year 2000, all children in America would “start 
school ready to learn”; 90 % would graduate from high school; all students would 
demonstrate high competency in English, math, science, history, and geography; the 
20  For the provisions of the law, see Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and 
Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988, H.R. 5, 100th Cong. (1988). For Hawkins, 
see “Hawkins, Augustus Freeman (Gus), ( 1907 –2007).” n.d.; for Stafford, see Reagan Walker, 
“Stafford: Republican Rebel During Reagan’s Revolution,”  Education Week, November 2, 1988, 
 http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1988/11/02/08450045.h08.html , and essays on “Hawkins-
Stafford Amendments,” and “Targeting the Achievement Gap” in  Federal Education Policy and the 
States, 1945–2009 ( 2009 ). On the importance of bipartisan support and accountability, see Jennings 
( 2015 , 48–49). 
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U.S. would be fi rst in the world in science and math; all adults would be literate and 
have the knowledge “to compete in a global economy” and become good citizens; 
and every school would be free of drugs and violence (Swanson  1991 ; on the nov-
elty of the aspiration to have all adults gain high-level  literacy skills , see Kaestle 
 1995 ). 
 These goals, of course, were optimistic statements. They were attainable only in 
part, and only if the reform movement could develop better theories about education 
reform and improved accountability systems. The period 1988 through 1992 was a 
very “yeasty” time for school reform ideas. NAEP tests at the state level now had 
the capacity to compare states’ performances on basic skills, though hardly anyone 
thought they should be used as a national “test” for the evaluation of individual 
students or teacher accountability. The states at the front of the school reform 
 movement were developing state-level standards and curriculum guides. Assessment 
experts were experimenting with more sophisticated “performance” assessments. 
 Enter Systemic Education 
 A key theory was articulated in a 1991 article by  Marshall Smith and  Jennifer 
O’Day called “ systemic school reform .” It crystallized several ideas that had been 
circulating in school reform circles and became a founding document for the 
standards- based reform movement. To be “systemic,” said Smith and O’Day, the 
states must create content  standards ,  performance standards ,  opportunity-to-learn 
standards (equal access to high-quality education), and student assessments, as well 
as foster teacher preparation and professional development that focus on the stan-
dards. To form a coherent program, all of these elements must be “aligned” (Smith 
and O’Day  1991 ). 21 
 Historian  Maris Vinovskis has analyzed the origins of this idea in the profes-
sional experiences of Smith and O’Day. As the director of the Wisconsin Center on 
Education Research, Smith was immersed in school improvement research, and his 
participation in the Consortium for Policy Research in Education reinforced his 
belief that the states should be the actors in developing standards. In 1990, Robert 
Schwartz, education director at the Pew Charitable Trusts, initiated the Pew Forum 
on School Reform, which included Smith. The forum began looking at exemplars of 
content standards from the various states and from abroad. O’Day, an expert policy 
analyst, was the associate director of the Pew Forum (Vinovskis  1999b , Chap. 7, 
175–81). 
 Smith and O’Day emphasized the problem of underperforming poor and minor-
ity students, who were so often in underperforming schools. If reformers did not 
attend to this problem, not only would those students have unequal opportunity, but 
21  Marshall S. Smith and Jennifer A. O’Day 1999, “Systemic School Reform,” in  The Politics of 
Curriculum and Testing (London, England: Falmer Press,  Politics of Education Yearbook, 1990): 
233–67. 
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the system itself would not be coherent. The idea of Opportunity to Learn (OTL) 
standards, which were designed to solve the problem of holding students responsi-
ble for meeting challenging standards when they may not have had adequate instruc-
tion in those standards, caused great controversy. 
 There were several problems with OTL standards. Some opponents said it was 
hard to imagine how one would operationalize indicators for OTL that would go 
beyond the many existing state policies like teacher certifi cation, curriculum guides, 
and rules about class size. Some governors opposed them because of the estimated 
cost of establishing and maintaining OTL systems. Other opponents viewed them as 
a federal incursion into local control. Others said it would just delay the much- 
needed standards-based reform movement. In the end, systemic reform without 
OTL standards became the backbone of the movement, which developed bipartisan 
support, and, despite great controversies, persisted as the unifying factor in federal 
and state education policy for 25 years, from the Clinton administration to the 
present. 
 Standards-Based Reform Arrives on the Federal Agenda 
 Governors and chief state school offi cers had been the prominent leaders in sys-
temic school reform in the 1980s. Yet upon the election of President Clinton in 
1992, the federal government reemerged as an education policy maker. Clinton was 
not shy to renew a strong federal role. He appointed  William Riley , popular former 
education governor of South Carolina, as Secretary of Education and Smith as dep-
uty in charge of drafting and promoting the legislative agenda in education. In addi-
tion to its enthusiasm for standards-based reform, the Clinton team focused on the 
problems of disadvantaged students. 
 The Education Department developed two bills during the fi rst two years of his 
administration. The fi rst bill was the reauthorization of ESEA. The Clinton admin-
istration renamed it the  Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) , but many old 
hands around Washington continued to call it ESEA. Also, the term “chapter” for a 
section of the law was returned to “title,” the pre-Reagan term. IASA proposed to 
alter the Title I formula to focus resources on districts with the highest poverty con-
centrations. This lost in a close vote in the House subcommittee. Meanwhile, the 
Title I threshold for whole-school approaches was lowered from schools with 75 % 
poverty families to 65 %. IASA introduced the new key provisions requiring dis-
tricts to test all kids (not just those in Title I) with  math and reading assessments that 
were geared to standards that states would be required to develop and implement. 
Other equity-related programs besides Title I remained: basic skills (Title II), aid for 
desegregation (Title VI), bilingual education (Title VII), women’s educational 
rights (Title IX), and Indian education (Title XI). 22 
22  On the legislative history of Title I in 1994, see Jennings ( 1998 , 118–53). For a summary of all 
the titles, see “Summary of the Improving America’s Schools Act,”  Education Week , November 9, 
1994,  http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1994/11/09/10asacht.h14.html 
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 The second bill was called The  Goals 2000 Act . It specifi ed how the states and 
the federal government would collaborate on systemic education, spurring many 
debates about the proper roles of the federal government. There were also equal 
opportunity concerns at stake. Smith and O’Day had focused attention on disadvan-
taged students and underperforming schools. There could be high standards for all 
children, and that became a mantra of standards-based reform. 
 The battle lines were typical: liberals vs. conservatives, and centralists vs. local-
ists. But there were wrinkles. Some Democrats wanted national standards, some did 
not; some also wanted national assessments. Many Republicans supported 
standards- based reform but wanted the states to be the main actors and not super-
vised by the federal government. In the compromises that were hammered out, 
Goals 2000 proposed a system where states were expected to establish content stan-
dards, performance standards, opportunity-to-learn standards, and assessments. 
Each state was required to establish a board to carry out this work. A new national 
board, called the  National Education Standards and Improvement Council (NESIC) , 
would approve state plans, but only on a voluntary basis. 
 Even though Goals 2000 did not require states to submit their standards to fed-
eral authorities, many Republicans reacted negatively to the establishment of NESIC 
and it remained unfunded by Congress. As for the controversial opportunity-to- 
learn standards, they remained in the department’s description of a proper systemic 
effort, but researcher Andrew Porter pointed out that there was little incentive for 
states to develop them, and even less incentive to subject them voluntarily to federal 
certifi cation (Porter  1995 ; for the detailed arguments and debates about standards 
and federal authority in standards-based education, see Ravitch  1995 ; Jennings 
 1998 ; Kaestle and Lodewick  2007 ). 
 Republicans made gains in Congress and asserted themselves. They succeeded 
in abolishing NESIC, squelched the administration’s suggestions for a Voluntary 
National Test, discredited a federally sponsored set of national history/social studies 
standards, and blocked the reauthorization of ESEA in 2000. The Democrats staved 
off some Republican assaults with help from some Senate Republicans who were 
not in tune with the more conservative program. 23 Nonetheless, Goals 2000 estab-
lished a framework that spread across the country and would remain the central 
reform instrument from that time to the present. Policy analyst  Margaret “Peg” 
Goertz reported in 2001 that 49 states had content standards in reading and math, 48 
of them had assessments to match, and 33 had developed  accountability measures 
that went beyond student test performance.  Paul Manna points out that several 
Republican governors and many business groups supported the standards move-
ment. Furthermore, general public opinion favored the Clinton education agenda. 
While the administration’s retreat from some issues may have looked like a defeat, 
23  Maris Vinovskis ( 2009 , 111–20) presents a balanced account of education policy in the Clinton 
years, with many more details. See the book and sources cited there. See also, among the many 
books dealing with this period, Cross ( 2014 ); DeBray ( 2006 ); McGuinn ( 2006 ); Manna ( 2007 ); 
Jennings ( 1998 ); and Ravitch ( 1995 ) . 
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standards-based education was progressing in the states. Ironically, that formula 
would take on a more authoritarian federal face in the administration of President 
 George W. Bush , a Republican (Manna  2007 , 103, 152–54). 
 Peg Goertz reminded me recently of a metaphor for this signifi cant policy suc-
cess. Title I of IASA, with its requirement that all districts test all students on assess-
ments that are linked to standards, could be considered the “stick,” forcing the 
standards-reform framework on the districts, while Goals 2000 was the “carrot,” the 
framework to help states and districts create standards-based systems. Conjuring up 
a different metaphor, Mike Smith said that the ESEA, with its requirements for 
school-wide testing and system accountability, was the “big engine” pulling all the 
other cars down the track. 24 
 No Child Left Behind: Its Trajectory Under George W. Bush 
and Barack Obama 
 Bush Launches New Federal Reforms 
 President Bush’s attraction to standards-based reform was similar to Clinton’s. Both 
had been education governors and enjoyed the reputation of having successfully 
improved his state’s schools. Bush was determined to continue the federal role in 
school reform, and his advocates fanned out to convince their conservative 
Republican colleagues that either they were out of step with public opinion or 
should give the President his preferences in education policy because the rest of his 
agenda was so attractive to conservative Republicans. But it took more effort than 
that.  Sandy Kress , Bush’s main education adviser, circulated the program fi rst as a 
platform rather than as specifi c legislation. Bush’s allies held meetings with care-
fully selected members of Congress. The campaign was skillfully done and uncon-
ventional. With Kress in charge, the administration and its Congressional allies 
bypassed the Senate Health Education and Pensions Committee, shunned the par-
ticipation of education lobby groups, and ignored the staff of the Department of 
Education. In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001, many Congress members believed that they should work to pass effective 
legislation and not appear to be in disarray. 
 For Democrats, there were some attractive features in Bush’s proposed  No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB) : an emphasis on improving failing schools and narrowing 
the achievement gap between racial groups, with disaggregated achievement test 
scores by group for each school available publicly, with some tough incentives and 
disincentives for schools that did not succeed. Senator Ted Kennedy endorsed the 
bill later in the process, hoping to get increased Title I money and achievement 
scores disaggregated by race-ethnic group. He got the scores but not much money. 
24  Margaret Goertz and Marshall Smith, personal communications. 
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His co-sponsorship capped the image of a bipartisan bill (see DeBray  2006 ). But the 
goal of reducing  achievement gaps was not solely the Democrats’ property. 
Campaigning for the presidency, Bush vowed that his education policy would attack 
the “soft bigotry of lowered expectations.” Speaking at Harvard in the second year 
of the Bush administration, Secretary of Education Rod Paige, himself African- 
American, said that the achievement gap “is the civil rights issue of our time,” and 
some leading civil rights lawyers like Christopher Edley of the Harvard Civil Rights 
Project and Bill Taylor of the Citizens Commission for Civil Rights supported 
NCLB for its tough approach and for setting an ultimate goal of reducing the gaps. 25 
 The Bush team concluded that the Clinton enforcement of Title I had been slack 
and unproductive. The attempt to ensure that all states would link Title I tests to 
standards-related tests for the whole student population was still languishing in non-
compliance. In response it produced the deepest intrusion into local control since 
desegregation. Some of its supporters in Congress and out in the states and the 
schools had second thoughts when they realized how much coercion was to be lev-
ied upon local school districts for not very much money. Schools were required to 
test all students in third through eighth grades annually. States were required to 
commit themselves to performance standards. Schools that did not come up to their 
 adequate yearly progress (AYP) commitments would eventually be liable for 
“reconstitution,” including sanctions as severe as having new leadership being 
appointed or being reopened as a charter school. This assumed that the states had 
the technical capacity to remedy poor performance, which was not always the case. 
 It began to appear that the rules would generate huge lists of condemned schools, 
because the end goals were set too high. Elizabeth DeBray ( 2006 ) wrote that the 
unrealistic goals and the concerns about the extent of federal leverage led to a “rocky 
start” for NCLB. The Bush administration softened some of the demanding features 
of the law but persisted in the end goal to have all children profi cient by 2014. That, 
some test experts said, was impossible. Robert Linn wrote in 2005, “There is con-
siderable evidence that gains in student performance on the tests tend to be greatest 
in the fi rst few years after they have been introduced as part of an accountability 
system and then taper off in later years.” Thus, those states that adopted low AYP 
goals in the early years, expecting to accelerate into higher achievement and smaller 
gaps later in the process, were working in exactly the wrong way. Said Linn, “It can 
be anticipated that the AYP goals, which are likely to be hard to meet in the early 
years, will become increasingly diffi cult to meet in the out years of the program” 
(DeBray  2006 , 129–43, Rothstein  2004 ; Linn  2005 ). 
 In the latter stages of Congressional consideration, some staff on the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions did some research, simulat-
ing how many schools would be deemed failing in three of the states known for 
25  George W. Bush’s speech to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
July 16, 2000, is quoted in “Bush Addresses NAACP Convention,” ABC News,  http://abcnews.
go.com/Politics/story?id=123409 ; Paige is quoted in Cara Feinberg, “Rod Paige Offers High 
Praise for No Child Left Behind,”  Harvard University Gazette, April 29, 2004, 1; on Edley’s sup-
port, see DeBray  2006 ; Taylor’s support is documented in Linn ( 2005 ) and personal interviews. 
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reducing the achievement gap: Texas, North Carolina, and Connecticut. Based on 
the AYPs, almost all the schools in these states would have been rated as “failing.” 
Presented at a meeting within the administration, these data produced a “stunned 
silence,” said a staffer. Another staff member said, “I left just wanting to cry” 
(Manna  2007 , 124–25). 
 The Bush people and their allies rushed to adjust the AYP formulas, but the 
results were unsuccessful. Once the bill was passed and in the fi eld, the Bush admin-
istration eased off, allowing different kinds of tests to be used and delaying dead-
lines. Paul Manna argues that the federal NCLB scheme actually relied on “borrowed 
state capacity” for its implementation, capacity which most states lacked. They real-
ized this and pushed back. Almost all states had a nominal set of content standards 
by this time, but many were not coherent and not matched by an aligned assessment 
regime (Manna  2007 ; DeBray  2006 ). Standards-based reform had become a con-
sensus position, with bipartisan appeal to centrists in both parties; Democrats on the 
civil rights left and conservative Republicans agreed with the Kennedy liberals and 
the Republican leadership in the Congress that there should be no amendments to 
the law at the end of Bush’s fi rst term, just administrative adjustments (Manna  2007 ; 
Cross  2014 ). 
 Some appraisals of achievement test scores suggest that there was a trough in 
which the achievement gaps widened during the end of the Clinton second term and 
for much of the fi rst Bush term. Many factors could be responsible. Most states had 
not accomplished the reforms of the 1994 reauthorization, and districts were now 
faced with the Bush administration’s new complex reform regime. In the second 
Bush term, he had an energetic Secretary of Education, Margaret Spellings, and the 
rules were clarifi ed. Still, there was much criticism of No Child Left Behind (see 
Goertz  2005 ). 
 Enter Obama and Duncan 
 As President Obama entered the White House, the country was descending into a 
fi scal crisis and a major recession. State and local budgets were reduced heavily. As 
part of the  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of February 2009, 
the President and Congress put a large amount of federal money into high-priority 
areas to create jobs, relieve local and state budgets, and put money in the pockets of 
consumers. Secretary  Arne Duncan ’s budget at the  Department of Education was 
nearly doubled with an ARRA allocation of $97.4 billion. The specifi c program 
areas receiving stimulus funding were State Fiscal Stabilization ($48.6 billion), col-
lege student  Pell grants ($16.5 billion), Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
funds ($12.2 billion), Title I programs ($10.0 billion), and formula grants and dis-
cretionary funds ($10.1 billion). Duncan and his staff had an unusual opportunity to 
fashion a new version of standards-based reform through these discretionary funds 
(Executive Offi ce of the President of the United States  2009 ). 
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 The Duncan team had to decide what to do about No Child Left Behind. It was 
still the law of the land, but it was widely discredited for its negative incentives and 
unrealistic achievement goals. States and school districts were in a budget squeeze 
with predictions that it would get worse in the coming few years. And all of this fell 
to a new Secretary who had been a successful superintendent of schools in Chicago 
but had no experience in Washington. Several of his assistant secretaries had not yet 
been appointed when ARRA was passed. Meanwhile, the department’s day-to-day 
business had to continue amid pressure to articulate a major reform strategy 
(U.S. Department of Education  2009 ). 
 With help from advisers around the country, Duncan and his staff developed a 
shift away from the NCLB mode of tight  monitoring and negative incentives. In 
addition to Title I and other entitlement programs, the new strategy was to have 
competitive grants and reward the best state applications with extra funding to 
implement their plans, a positive incentive. The state plans had to comply with cri-
teria set by the department. 
 From a critical perspective, there are (at least) two things to be questioned in 
retrospect: fi rst,  Race to the Top rewarded the 19 states deemed to have the best 
potential for effective reform, that is, the states with the best grant writers and the 
most broad support for their plan among their stakeholders. The 31 states that did 
not receive Race to the Top grants either opted out for various reasons or applied 
and were not chosen. The amounts were not trivial; in the fi rst round, only two 
awards were announced, $500 million to Tennessee and $100 million to Delaware. 
Later awards were reduced as the budget dwindled. In any case, the competition left 
the children of those 31 states who did not receive Race to the Top awards without 
funds that those states might have used to improve their systems. This was the price 
for rewarding excellence. 26 
 Second, the Education Department under Duncan took a very prescriptive stance. 
It insisted that every state applying for Race to the Top had to increase the number 
of  charter schools and adopt  pay-for-performance as part of salary decisions for 
teachers. Among the many possible policy options that one might have urged for 
mandatory implementation, many would have had a better basis in research than 
simply establishing more charter schools or using student scores in setting teachers’ 
salaries—for example, access to early childhood education or carefully targeted 
class-size reduction. Research does not support the idea that simply increasing the 
number of charter schools will improve academic achievement. Charter schools 
perform about the same as public schools on a national average (C. Lubienski and 
S. Lubienski  2014 ). After some criticism from the fi eld on this issue, the department 
began explaining that it meant to say it wanted more well-monitored, excellent char-
ter schools, but the states got the fi rst message loud and clear. 
 Similarly, the department created a list of strategies for rescuing failing schools. 
To get a federal grant for this work, applicants would have to choose one of the four 
strategies. Some people in the fi eld thought that having to choose from a list of 
26  “Delaware and Tennessee Win First Race to the Top Grants,” U.S. Department of Education, 
press release, March 29, 2010,  www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2010/03/03292010.html 
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strategies issued by the federal government foreclosed input from those who knew 
the particular circumstances, assets, and local constituencies of a given school or 
district. Jack Jennings studied hundreds of districts that had experience with turn-
arounds, some with federal grants, some not. He found very mixed results. Three of 
the federal strategies got low grades; one of them got much higher grades. It seemed 
to Jennings that the Department of Education was basing its confi dence “on a hunch 
rather than on evidence.” 27 
 By the beginning of the second Obama term, most of the funds from ARRA were 
expended. Congress, meanwhile, was gridlocked by partisan confl ict, so the No 
Child Left Behind legislation had not been reauthorized and, at the time of this 
 writing, there seems little prospect of it happening before the end of the second 
Obama term. In response to this gridlock, the department simply relaxed some of 
the procedures of NCLB regarding failed deadlines for a district’s AYP. This prac-
tice was formalized into a state-by-state granting of  waivers , giving Duncan a new 
means of leverage. Each state receiving a waiver had to agree to a long list of the 
Department of Education’s procedures that would substitute for the NCLB 
approaches. Forty- three states plus the District of Columbia had received waivers 
by November 2014. 28 
 The “era” of standards-based education at the federal level has spanned the 
administrations of three Presidents: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and  Barack 
Obama . Their approaches to school reform shared two features: fi rst, all three put a 
very strong emphasis on schools with concentrations of economically and educa-
tionally disadvantaged children, abiding by the durable Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act. The central indicator of their success in these efforts was a slight but 
durable narrowing of gaps in student assessment results. This also took account of 
rising average scores by group, as well as retention and graduation rates. Second, all 
three placed the federal government in a strong relationship with the states and 
schools. 
 In all three cases, the strategy changes were infl uenced by reactions to the previ-
ous administration. Following Reagan’s retreat from a strong federal role in educa-
tion, Clinton asserted leadership in promoting standards-based reform. In the Bush 
administration there was widespread opinion that Goals 2000 had not worked well 
in the 1990s because so many of the states were not complying with Congressional 
decisions. Thus, it was time to get tough. In the Obama case, it was the opinion, 
again widely shared, that the Bush version of standards-based reform was too nega-
tive in its incentives. A swing toward positive incentives and showcasing success 
27  On Jennings’ work, see Katherine Gewertz, “Restructuring Schools under NCLB Found to Lag.” 
 Education Week December 9, 2009; the quotation is from “New Study Questions Turnaround 
Strategies,”  EdNews Blog ,  http://blog.ednewscolorado.org/2009/12/09/new-study-questions-turn-
around-strategies . For the department’s account of the grant program as of 2015, including a map 
indicating how the four strategies were distributed around the country, see “Turnaround Schools,” 
 Education Week, June 10, 2015. 
28 Allie Bidwell, “Education Department Drops New NCLB Waiver Guidance: The Waiver 
Extension Could Lock in Key Obama Administration Education Policies Past 2016,”  U.S. News 
and World Report, November 13, 2014. 
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became the rhetoric; in reality, the resources that came with successful competition 
required states or districts to comply with many specifi c ideas generated by the 
Secretary and his top staff. 
 The Importance of Title I 
 Background 
 Title I has a historical importance as the program that led the way in federal efforts 
to improve educational opportunity. It has generated an ocean of research papers 
and policy arguments about whether to continue, improve, or abolish the program. 
Within the research and policy fi elds there is little consensus on how to interpret test 
scores such as NAEP in relation to Title I, and little consensus about what would 
constitute success (eliminating test score gaps across groups, reducing them, or 
keeping them from getting worse). The program is widely criticized despite increas-
ing scores and slightly declining  gaps between race-ethnic groups and decades of 
solid bipartisan support for the general idea of Title I. 
 Part of the dominance of Title I in such discussions has to do with the attraction 
to test scores and Title I’s linkage to NAEP. Journalists follow suit, highlighting 
these test scores, although whether the emphasis on scores is appropriate is an open 
question. In contrast, consider the fi eld of special education. Although special edu-
cation’s budget exceeds Title I in most districts, and federal support for it now rivals 
Title I, it does not have a simple annual set of achievement scores to report and 
receives less notice. 
 Some critics say that Title I has failed to close the  achievement gaps . They also 
say there is no proof Title I is responsible for the modest narrowing of gaps in the 
test scores by race-ethnicity because NAEP does not actually identify Title I kids. 
Therefore, some say, Title I should be discontinued. Thus, Title I is an important 
topic; it would be an enormous decision to discontinue this durable but plagued 
symbol of the nation’s commitment to improving the education of the children of 
poverty. 
 NAEP’s Relation to Title I 
 To satisfy Title I regulations, states had to report academic assessment scores for 
their districts. As a concession to a long tradition of opposition to national tests, 
they could devise their own tests, but that meant the scores were not comparable 
across states. Since 1971, however, NAEP has been taking a representative sample 
of students across the country and assessing them all on the same material. Those 
scores were available only for national averages for the fi rst two decades after 
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NAEP’s introduction, due to the same apprehension about a national test and under-
mining state prerogatives. By the 1990s, however, the states’ opposition subsided 
and state-by-state assessments were developed on a trial basis in 1990. They became 
routine as of 1996. 
 NAEP prominently reports two kinds of data on achievement because they map 
onto the dual goals of Title I and standards-based reform: fi rst, increases in the aver-
age scores for all students, and second, the gaps between the scores for students in 
the different race, ethnic, or income groups. The former is most closely related to 
the “quality” goal of education reform. (How good is my state doing as a whole 
compared to other countries or states, and how do my state’s scores compare to our 
own scores for previous years?) The gaps between groups are most closely associ-
ated with the “equality” goal. (As the scores rise or fall for various subgroups, are 
the gaps decreasing or increasing between those groups?) 
 NAEP has kept comparable national fi gures since 1971 in reading and since 
1973 in mathematics. Some changes were made in content and demands of the 
assessments during the 1970s and 1980s, but the Department of Education  considers 
the trend lines reliable through to the present (this data series is now called  Long-
Term NAEP ). However, as the changes in the test became more frequent and more 
fundamental, the NAEP board decided in 1990 to establish a second, more fl exible 
series ( Main NAEP ) that would keep up with the changes and thus refl ect the new 
work as well. Presently the Department of Education emphasizes the Main NAEP 
data for the ongoing release of scores and for interpretation of trends since 1990. 
The department states that the scores on these two series are not comparable to each 
other, but that  within each series, the changes made in the test have not caused a 
break in the trend lines of the scores (U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics.  2015b ; Beaton and Chromy  2010 ). 
 Long-Term NAEP: Trends and Interpretations 
 For the period before 1990 we have only the Long-Term NAEP, and much analysis 
has been performed on these data. Nancy Kober, writing in 2001, presented achieve-
ment results from the Long-Term NAEP up to 1999. Kober noted that as the NAEP 
scores for White students in  math and reading improved, so did Black scores. But 
the average scores for Blacks were rising more steeply. Graphs of Black and White 
scores in mathematics displayed a secular trend, steadily and gradually upward in 
scores, plus some gradual reduction in gaps by 1999. The reading scores were more 
bimodal, starting with a large gap of 39 points in 1971, falling to a low gap of 18 
points in 1988, and then increasing to a 1999 gap of 29—still 10 points lower than 
in 1971. 
 Kober attributed the gaps remaining in 1999 partly to school factors for disad-
vantaged kids, such as less qualifi ed or less experienced teachers; lower expecta-
tions; concentration of  low-income students in some schools; school climate less 
conducive to learning; and disparities in access to preschool. Also, there are com-
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munity or home factors: the effects of poverty on learning, a legacy of discrimina-
tion, and limited learning supports in homes and communities (Kober  2001 ; 
Ferguson and Mehta  2004 ). 
 Going beyond NAEP,  Geoffrey Borman and  Jerome D’Agostino performed a 
meta-analysis of 17 major assessments from 1966 to 1999. They wanted to test the 
notion that there had basically been no change over time in the effectiveness of Title 
I in raising achievement scores, which they say is the conventional wisdom. Their 
fi ndings support the opposite view. The historical record also supports their view. 
The earliest years of Title I in the late 1960s and into the 1970s were characterized 
by weak enforcement, widespread abuse of rules by districts, and lack of consensus 
at all levels about how to improve the education of poor children in underperform-
ing schools. By the 1980s oversight had improved, rules had tightened, and many 
more districts had accepted the challenge that had been tossed to them 20 years 
earlier. 
 Borman and D’Agostino found that Title I students were achieving greater gains 
in later decades than their similar peers not in Title I programs. To the argument that 
it still left substantial gaps between them and their non-Title I peers, Borman and 
D’Agostino argued that the Title I students “would have fallen farther behind” with-
out Title I. To eliminate such gaps altogether would require the elimination of edu-
cational disadvantages beyond the school: poor nutrition, health, housing, and low 
parents’ education, all in a negative, symbiotic relationship with poverty (Borman 
and D’Agostino  1996 ). 
 Ronald F. Ferguson reviewed the research on the effectiveness of the following 
reforms: reducing ability grouping and tracking; eliminating racially biased place-
ments; providing more Black teachers for Black students; decreasing class sizes; 
and increasing the academic skills of teachers who predominantly taught students of 
color. For most of these he sees some merit. He summarizes in a clear and sensible 
conclusion: “Whether the Black-White test score gap would narrow if schools and 
teachers become more effective is uncertain. I believe it would. However, if the gap 
were to remain because all children improved, that too would be acceptable.” 
(Ferguson  1998 ; see also Hedges and Nowell  1998 ). 
 The 1980s and 1990s: Studying Actual Title I Students 
 Despite some upward trend in NAEP scores in the 1980s and 1990s, Title I received 
much criticism. One interesting study with some positive fi ndings was the 
“Sustaining Effects Study” headed up by Launor Carter in the early 1980s, relying 
on three years of data from the mid-1970s. Unlike NAEP data, their data distin-
guished between students in compensatory education programs (mostly Title I) and 
those who were not. Their sample included 120,000 students in 300 elementary 
schools. It could take achievement scores with participation in compensatory educa-
tion and match them with the poverty status of families and race-ethnicity of the 
students taking the test. They compared Title I students with students who were 
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described at the beginning as “needing” Title I but not assigned. They found the 
Title I students’ scores higher. Very few datasets had as many variables as the Carter 
“Sustaining Effects” data, so it is not known in most studies of achievement gaps 
who had been in Title I; all that is known is students’ NAEP scores and their race- 
ethnicity, sex, and an indicator of family income (free lunch, partial free lunch, no 
free lunch) (Carter  1984 ). 
 By the 1990s there was much debate and publicity about achievement gaps, 
almost all of it around race-ethnicity. These debates were spurred by episodes of 
academic racism regarding race and IQ. As a result, the focus in Title I studies 
switched from family income to students’ race-ethnicity. 
 In 1999, Maris Vinovskis reviewed the history of Title I. Vinovskis is a demo-
graphic historian and frequent consultant on both sides of the aisle, focusing on fed-
eral program effectiveness. With regard to Title I, Vinovskis judged that “efforts to 
radically change its approach or focus were ignored or defeated in the early 1980s.” 
A Congressionally managed  study called “Prospects” followed three cohorts over six 
years and concluded that Title I “did not appear to help at-risk  students in high-pov-
erty schools to close their academic achievement gaps with students in low-poverty 
schools.” Like the Carter study, the Congressional “Prospects” data included whether 
students were in Title I or not. The authors reported that (in Vinovskis’ words) Title I 
was “insuffi cient to close the gap in academic achievement between advantaged and 
disadvantaged students” (Vinovskis  1999a ). I lack the expertise and the space here to 
evaluate the “Prospects” work. I note, however, that “eliminating” the achievement 
gap is a high hurdle. If disadvantaged students were not totally closing the gap 
between their scores and those of advantaged students, they might nonetheless have 
been keeping it from widening, and Title I might have been a factor. But gaps accord-
ing to income, though they were not as emphasized, were fl at or widening in recent 
decades, while those between race-ethnic groups were decreasing. (Reardon  2011 ; 
also see Jencks and Phillips  1998 , Chap.  9 ). 
 NAEP Score Gaps after 2000 
 Analyses of Title I’s achievement data after 2000 display similar score trends and 
the same diversity of judgments as those from the 1970s to the 1990s. Considering 
the large scope of this essay and the ocean of research literature about the effects of 
Title I, I shall present the Main NAEP scores for the period from 2000 to 2013 for 
the gaps by race-ethnicity that have been emphasized most in public discussions 
(Porter  2005 ; Clarke  2007 ; Dee and Jacob  2011 ; Carnoy and Loeb  2002 ). 
 Tables  3.3 and  3.4 display the Main NAEP scores by race-ethnic group in read-
ing and mathematics, for the period from 1992 to 2013, for grades 4, 8, and 12. For 
example, fourth-grade reading scores for White students begin in 1992 with an aver-
age of 224, rising gradually but steadily to an average of 232 in 2013. Average 
scores of Black students on the same assessments go up and down during the 1990s, 
and then climb steadily to 206, thus reducing the White/Black achievement gap 
from 32 to 26. The movements are modest and some changes are not statistically 
signifi cant, but the trends continue across grade levels, as well as across reading and 
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 Table 3.3  Main NAEP reading scores, 1992–2013: White/Black and White/Hispanic gaps 
 1992  1994  1998  2000  2002  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013 
 Grade 4 
 White  224  224  225  225  229  229  231  230  231  232 
 Black  192  185  193  191  199  200  203  205  205  206 
 W/B gap  32  39  32  34  30  29  28  25  26  26 
 Hispanic  197  188  193  197  201  203  205  205  206  207 
 W/H gap  27  36  32  28  28  26  26  25  25  25 
 Grade 8 
 White  267  267  270  –  272  271  272  273  274  276 
 Black  237  236  244  –  245  243  245  246  249  250 
 W/B gap  30  31  26  –  27  28  27  27  25  26 
 Hispanic  241  243  243  –  247  246  247  249  252  256 
 W/H gap  26  24  27  –  25  25  25  24  22  20 
 Grade 12 
 White  297  293  297  –  292  293  –  296  –  297 
 Black  273  265  269  –  267  267  –  269  –  268 
 W/B gap  24  28  28  –  25  26  –  27  –  29 
 Hispanic  279  270  275  –  273  272  –  274  –  276 
 W/H gap  28  23  22  –  19  21  –  22  –  21 
 Table 3.4  Main NAEP mathematics scores, 1992–2013: White/Black and White/Hispanic gaps 
 1990  1992  1996  2000  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013 
 Grade 4 
 White  220  227  231  235  243  246  248  248  249  250 
 Black  188  193  199  204  216  220  222  222  224  224 
 W/B gap  32  34  32  31  27  26  26  26  25  26 
 Hispanic  200  202  205  209  222  226  227  227  229  231 
 W/H gap  20  27  26  26  21  20  21  21  20  19 
 Grade 8 
 White  270  277  281  285  288  289  291  293  293  294 
 Black  237  237  242  246  252  255  260  261  262  263 
 W/B gap  33  40  39  41  36  34  31  32  31  31 
 Hispanic  246  249  251  253  259  262  265  266  270  272 
 W/H gap  24  28  30  32  29  27  26  27  22  22 
 Grade 12 
 White  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  157  n/a  161  n/a  162 
 Black  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  127  n/a  131  n/a  132 
 W/B gap  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  30  30  30 
 Hispanic  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  133  n/a  138  n/a  141 
 W/H gap  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  24  n/a  21  n/a  21 
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math and across the White/Black gap, suggesting some progress. The scores and 
gaps follow parallel patterns for eighth graders, and for Hispanic students in 12th 
grade. The gaps in eighth-grade reading achievement of Black and Hispanic stu-
dents, as well as for Hispanic students in Grade 12, are narrowed. In general, the 
upward movement is mostly observed in the assessments from 2002 to 2013, rather 
than in the period 1992–2000. 29 
 In sum, the Main NAEP scores for 1990–2013 move gradually upward, with the 
three groups mostly parallel but narrowing the gaps slightly. These numbers support 
an argument made by various researchers: If the Black and Hispanic scores are 
keeping pace, and if those scores are affected by Title I programs, we should 
 continue and improve Title I. The seriousness of the gap between Whites and stu-
dents of color has been a central feature of discussions about equality of educational 
opportunity since at least the 1990s. 
 But do the NAEP scores by race-ethnicity tell us about Title I? As we have seen, 
the Title I money goes to individual schools according to the number of parents under 
the poverty line as defi ned in the legislation, but the instruction is administered to 
children selected by their low scores in math and reading, regardless of their race-
ethnicity or their families’ income. Studies that actually track students in Title I 
instruction are few, and the ones mentioned above come to rather different conclu-
sions (see Borman and D’Agostino  1996 ; and Carter  1984 ). Nonetheless, both rec-
ommend that Title I be continued and improved. As a historian interested in the 
history of educational opportunity, I hold this view. Many other researchers, some 
mentioned above, have made research-based suggestions for improving Title I pro-
grams (Carnoy and Loeb  2002 ; Dee and Jacob  2011 ; Ferguson  1998 ; Jennings  1998 ). 
 Some Generalizations 
 Before moving into the concluding sections of the report, I feel it is worth drawing 
some key generalizations about the evolution of the federal role in education and 
developments that laid the foundations for the reforms in play today. 
 Three Eras in the History of the Federal Role in Education 
 In the history of the  federal role in education , there are “eras” that seem pretty clear. 
The fi rst is from 1965 (or, if you wish, the National Defense Education Act in 1958) 
to 1980, when you have several important and controversial additions to the federal 
repertoire in the direction of equity. From 1980 through 1988, we have the Reagan 
29  For mathematics, the fourth-grade scores for Whites move from an average of 220 (in 2000) to 
an average of 250 (in 2013). Black average scores keep pace, from 188 to 224, reducing the gap 
from 32 to 24. Hispanic fourth-graders scored an average of 200 in 1990, up to 231 in 2013, leav-
ing the gap essentially level (from 20 to 19). In eighth grade, all three groups’ average scores edged 
up from year to year, virtually parallel. 
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presidency, the second “era.” There is then a transition period under George H. W. 
Bush, whose inclination was to form a new partnership between states and the fed-
eral level but who instead got partisanship as the Democrats voted down his omni-
bus school reform bill. Thus, he falls between the second and the third era. That 
third era began in earnest with the presidency of Bill Clinton in 1993. From that 
time to the present, we have a unifying policy goal: standards-based education 
reform, spanning a Democratic President, then George W. Bush, a Republican, and 
Barack Obama, a Democrat. 
 Conditions for Change 
 The expansion of the federal role in education that began in 1965 coincided with the 
escalation of the civil rights movement, a mostly healthy economy, and a Supreme 
Court that, after a 10-year sleep, was ready to expand the authority of the  Brown 
decision by asserting that the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required 
the courts to guarantee equal rights in education. During this time, savvy grassroots 
movements pressed for women’s rights and the rights of children with disabilities, 
and Latino families demanded to see their cultures in their children’s schools. This 
context helped these equity efforts, but still they weren’t easy. Still, as James 
Patterson ( 1996 ) argues, the liberal agenda prevailed partly because a majority of 
people in the United States believed that the country could afford these reforms and 
that a rising tide would lift all boats. 
 Congress as the Arena for Advocacy and Compromise 
 Congress, especially the House of Representatives, was the arena where different 
interests and different regions began the process of advocacy and compromise. In 
the case of Title I, Congress spent most of its discussion time debating how the 
money was going to be divided, not on how the Title I classes might succeed. The 
resulting compromises ended with too little money spread over too many districts. 
These compromises were necessary for passage in Congress but impaired the pro-
gram once in the fi eld. 
 Lack of Constitutional Authority as a Hindrance 
 Beyond Congress, Title I advocates had to reckon with the federal role in education 
having no explicit authority in the Constitution and very little acceptance until the 
1950s. That tradition guaranteed that any time there was a federal assertion of 
authority, it energized those who believed in local and state control. Localism and 
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centralism, the “alter egos” of our Constitutional government, have never been far 
from educational policy making. 
 States and Districts Forced to Focus on New Populations 
 Lorraine McDonnell uses the three-era framework to make some fresh generaliza-
tions about the evolution of the federal role. Her depiction of the fi rst era is relevant 
here. She urges us to think of it as a period of rather urgent interest in monitoring 
grants and making more specifi c rules for states and districts. She emphasizes an 
important point: The federal government was thereby forcing states and districts to 
focus on particular clients (English language learners, poor students, students of 
color, and students with disabilities), which was alien to the culture of schools 
(McDonnell  2005 ). The states and districts had sometimes distributed their resources 
in surreptitious, perhaps unconscious ways with deleterious effects: through assign-
ment to ability groups, through tracking, and through the superior resources of some 
schools in White neighborhoods. Now they were asked to account for distributions, 
and they were told that money from some grants had to go, not just to some  activity 
(like science education), but to certain  students . This took time and money for 
school districts as well as an increase in the intrusiveness of state and federal offi -
cials; reformers, however, believed that these drawbacks would be outweighed by 
the fairness and effectiveness of the new categories and programs. 
 The Numbers Game 
 This was a time of fast development in budgets, accounting, and in the social sciences 
in order to judge programs by their output, not their input. Data became king.  James 
Coleman ’s famous study of the relationship between academic test scores and race, 
class, school facilities, and other variables became a model for using achievement as 
a measure of program performance. The Pentagon’s new Planning Programing and 
Budgeting system (PPBS) spread through the cabinet departments and out into other 
government levels under the infl uence of Secretary of Defense  Robert McNamara . 
PPBS faded, but it had picked up on the changing standards of accountability. Frank 
Keppel, new Commissioner of Education for President Kennedy, was appalled that 
the Offi ce of Education had almost no  data on student learning , and he began to 
develop NAEP behind the scenes, doing it privately (because of the animus against a 
possible national test) with funds from John Gardner, then-chairman of the Carnegie 
Corporation in New York. Thus began the era of accountability that focused on actual 
performance of children in educational programs. It took years before federal and 
state offi cials could get legitimate, suffi cient, standardized test data from thousands 
and thousands of school districts, many of them resistant, but in the late 1960s and the 
1970s, the seeds were sown (see Dwyer  2005 ). 
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 The Reality of Delays 
 Delays in working out regulations and guidelines, pauses for changes in administra-
tions, and other processes can add several years to the gap between the President’s 
signing a bill and the agency in charge sending out notices of a law’s activation date. 
These are the building blocks it takes to initiate a new major policy area from the 
federal level, as we have seen in our glimpse of the implementation of bilingual 
education, Title IX, and special education. 
 Impressive Action Despite the Odds 
 Given these pitfalls, it is impressive how many equity issues the federal government 
embraced and how much legislation it produced that affected schools. During the 
fertile time from the passage of ESEA in 1965 to the end of the 1970s, bilingual 
education, equal access and treatment for women students, equal access and treat-
ment of children with disabilities, improvements in Native Americans’ schools, and 
other programs took hold. 
 The Federal Government’s Agenda-Setting Role 
 It is diffi cult to prove the benefi ts of these federal education programs, but at the 
very least, the federal government put them on the agenda with some regulations, 
expectations, and assistance. In none of these cases is it easy to document educa-
tional outcomes. But these items were, with some exceptions, not even on the radar 
at state and local levels before federal action. In cases where some of the states were 
ahead, as in special education, bilingual and other areas, federal advocates were 
able to benefi t from this groundwork and use their national scope to generalize the 
concerns to other states. It’s impressive to see that many new equity programs for 
new target populations developed in such a short time and in such a complicated 
system as federalism. 
 The Half-Truth About the Federal Role 
 The narrative of a relentless, engulfi ng federal control of education is a half-truth. 
The trouble with a half-truth is that half of it is true. The half that’s true here is that 
there is a much greater presence of federal programs and rules in America’s schools 
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today than there was in 1950. 30 Nonetheless, in 1965 the percent of  local budgets 
provided by the federal government was 7.9 %, while in 2008, it was 8.0 %. From 
1965 until 2009, it never went lower than 6.1 % or higher than 8.3 %. 
 Federal Action Can’t Do It Alone 
 As Jack Jennings reminds us, policy collaboration in a federalist system is not a 
zero-sum game. An increase in federal activity on school reform may occur at a 
time of increasing state reform activity. Even the local level may fi nd itself creating 
more policy rather than less at the time that the role of the federal government and 
the states increase. Systemic reform, or Common Core, are complicated endeavors 
and require increased policy activity at all levels. 31 
 Not a Straight Evolution 
 Obviously, given the example of the Reagan reduction of a federal role in education, 
the evolution is not just linear upward. People may argue about how abrupt and how 
deep Reagan’s attempted reversal was. In this chapter I’ve emphasized the serious 
reduction in the budget, the small but symbolically important block grant in ECIA, 
and the reduction in civil rights enforcement. But Congress, including some 
Republicans, prevented some of the most severe cuts, saved Title I and other pro-
grams from being included in the block grant, and prevented President Reagan from 
abolishing the new Department of Education. 
 From Laissez-Faire to Monitoring 
 Quite apart from the drift toward student achievement scores, the Offi ce of Education 
had to change its mentality beginning in the 1960s. Far from being avaricious 
bureaucrats anxious to control state education agencies and their school districts, 
the Offi ce of Education had, for a century, been a sleepy agency with a strong incli-
nation not to tell anyone what to do. It continually assured people in the fi eld that it 
had no regulatory ambitions. This caused quite a staff crisis when the new breed 
came in. Keppel found a staff that was disinclined and untrained to monitor  compli-
ance . This applied very much to the desegregation effort, but there was also a 
30  This cute but important point is found in my lecture notes from Professor Eric McKitrick’s 
course in mid-nineteenth century America, Columbia University, fall 1966. 
31  In my experience, this important declaration belongs to Jack Jennings, in one private chat, and at 
a couple of meetings. If it comes initially from Montesquieu, please forgive me. 
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general disinclination to keep track of education program grants. Quick pressure to 
get new people and train old veterans shook up the Washington staff. After 1965, the 
Offi ce of Education gradually became a policy and compliance agency. The vexing 
question was how much to trust local districts given a history of segregating schools, 
falsifying conditions, and misappropriating Title I funds. Finding the right balance 
between trust and compliance remains an ongoing issue, and it requires bureaucratic 
genius and diplomatic skills to do so. 
 The Conundrum of the Federal Role in Common Core 
 The third era, discussed at some length above, ended in an interesting conundrum. 
The three presidents of the third era, along with their Secretaries of Education and 
the U.S. Congress, created a federal policy of standards-based education, although 
the standards themselves were to be forged by each state. Then, after Clinton’s for-
ays into possible national standards and national tests were defeated, a group of 
former governors, educators, and businesspeople began talking about the possibility 
of a cooperative effort to develop such national standards and tests. This led eventu-
ally to the formation of a proposal sponsored by the governors and the chief state 
school offi cers to promote a compact called “Common Core.” It is quite startling 
how the states acquiesced in the functions of the big, new collaboration of the 
 National Governors’ Association and the  Council of Chief State School Offi cers , 
which is providing national standards and, through two national contractors, assess-
ments to match. This will have a strong impact on the development of curriculum; 
indeed, vendors in the private sector have gone into action to offer curriculum mate-
rials that will be aligned to the national standards and assessments. The develop-
ment of standards had until this time been in the hands of the states. In most of the 
states, reformers persuaded a majority of the public and the school leaders to con-
sent to this new national system. The conundrum is twofold: How did this happen, 
and where does it leave the role of the federal government? We turn, then, to a brief 
presentation about the Common Core to understand the complex juncture at which 
we have arrived. 
 A National Arena of Education Policy: Common Core 
 There is an arena of policy formation and dissemination that is properly called 
“national,” in which reforms move across state lines from district to district by 
informal, nonlegislative means but with some considerable infl uence. In the early 
twentieth century, this meant the consolidation of rural districts and the develop-
ment of a multitrack high school curriculum. In the mid-twentieth century, it 
involved the articulation of the “comprehensive” American high school, which drew 
upon ideas from the early twentieth century. In the 1980s, it involved other reform 
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ideas like increased standards and more discipline. Sometimes this “national” dia-
logue informed state policy makers just as much as federal legislation, depending 
upon the issue. 
 Common Core, a recent movement, is a very large and ambitious hybrid of 
“national” and “federal.” The National Governors’ Association and the Council of 
Chief State School Offi cers proposed nationwide content standards to be shared 
across states. Common Core advocates argue that it is not a federal but a “national” 
project. On the other hand, the Department of Education has put its considerable 
power and resources behind the Common Core. In the fi rst Obama administration, 
candidates for the Race to the Top were required to join a consortium for multistate 
assessments, a key ingredient of Common Core. The department funded these two 
big  assessment consortia . More recently the department withdrew NCLB waivers 
from two states that withdrew from participation in the Common Core. Thus, it 
seems accurate to say that this is a national project, initiated by the governors and 
the chiefs but strongly supported by the Department of Education (see Rothman 
 2011 ). 
 Even though the Common Core is mostly the work of the governors and chief 
state school offi cers and their staffs, it is nonetheless a strong assertion of authority 
exercised by a national group over traditional state authority in the area of school 
curriculum planning and testing. Advocates emphasize that content standards are 
not the same as curriculum (indeed they are not) and that Common Core provides 
content standards, not curricula (also true). But planning a school program (includ-
ing the curriculum) is much infl uenced by the standards; furthermore, having also 
agreed to assessments from multistate consortia, the states will experience another 
strong interstate effect on their curriculum. 
 Many advocates think that this is an arrangement worth making, usually justifi ed 
on quality and capacity grounds, which are unevenly distributed across states. 
Common Core advocates argue that academic performance will be upgraded by 
adopting these high standards and common assessments. Still, most of what people 
feared about  “national tests” in earlier debates applies here: The consortia have 
already made compromises about tests of higher-level abilities because assessing 
these abilities requires more complicated technology and more test time, something 
that some states want and others do not. We shall see how it plays out. 
 Equality and Quality With the Common Core 
 Common Core emphasizes improvement in the quality of the standards. It includes 
much more analysis and other higher-order skills. This is laudable and exciting but 
also raises anxieties. Teachers in many states feel the implementation schedule is far 
too rapid and that they have not had suffi cient professional development to teach to 
the standards well, especially because for many teachers the test scores will count 
in their performance evaluations. The other source of opposition to the Common 
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Core is from local-control conservatives who are beginning to make Common Core 
a major issue in some states. 
 The possible effects of the Common Core on equity and disparate impact is not 
receiving as much attention as these other concerns, but it is crucial to the subject of 
this chapter: How functional for equal opportunity is the coming realignment of 
authority under the Common Core? Will children from low-income families and 
children of color be negatively impacted by the new, high demands of the Common 
Core? Will their teachers be as ready to teach to the Common Core standards as the 
teachers of more affl uent children? Will our underperforming schools be able to 
teach effectively to these more demanding standards, with less experienced faculty 
and many children under the stresses of poverty and racial bias? In any case, the 
kaleidoscope of federalist governance seems to be turning to a new pattern. It will 
be fascinating to see what kind of a picture we get in fi ve or six years, when the 
pieces come into clearer focus at the federal, state, and local levels. In particular, we 
will be interested in how the new alignment of initiative and authority will serve 
efforts to broaden educational opportunity and reduce gaps in academic 
achievement. 
 Federal Funding: A Final Overview 
 Before  engaging  in some policy suggestions, it is worth doing a broad review of the 
federal funding picture of education to provide an overview of the federal portion’s 
size relative to state and local contributions. What appears to be a substantial expan-
sion of the federal role in education occurred during the 50 years following 1965. 
This period was marked by a generally expansive economy, bipartisan cooperation, 
the civil rights movement, the augmented role of the United States in a turbulent 
world, the growing importance of education in the economy, the skills of education 
reformers in the Congress and the executive agencies, and the strong roles of advo-
cacy groups on education, both traditional and new. But how big an expansion was 
it? 
 Table  3.5 displays the changing share of  school districts’ expenses paid by local, 
state, and federal government. From these data we can see a prevailing increase in 
the federal share during this period of strong increase overall in the context of the 
long-term trends from 1920 to 2012. The downturn in the 1980s was due to policy 
preferences of the Reagan administration, though resisted with some success by 
supporters of education in the Congress. The peak, from 2010 to 2012, was due to 
emergency funds to the Department of Education from Congress in the wake of the 
2008 economic crisis. We can assume that those percentages will decrease when the 
offi cial statistics are posted for 2013 and following.
 In the big expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, the federal share of local dollar 
expenditures grew from 4.4 to 9.8 %, about double. But is that a lot of money? It’s 
worth pointing out that federal dollars are the kind that local administrators want 
because they are almost all devoted to new kinds of learning, new clients, and 
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improvement of instruction; in contrast, much of the remaining approximately 90 % 
is largely needed for infl exible costs such as building and maintenance, salaries, 
student transportation, supplies, and similar necessities. So federal money has two 
rather large impacts: It provides program money and it allows the federal govern-
ment to infl uence the agenda of the schools and require some accountability. 
 Although it is well to remember that the lion’s share of the cost of public educa-
tion falls to the state and local resources, opposition to the growing federal role is 
not about money as much as it is against new programs that require changes, rules, 
and accountability that infringe on local control. Whatever the objective of the fed-
eral initiatives—desegregation, better science classes, teacher evaluations, improved 
education of disadvantaged children, or adopting the Common Core—objections to 
federal assertions can also be justifi ed on philosophical bases that are deeply 
ingrained in our history and our political preferences about how democracy best 
works in a very large country. 
 Some Policy Suggestions 
 This chapter has taken a broad look at the federal role in education, particularly 
about issues of equity. It has looked in detail at efforts to raise the achievement of 
poor children and those of color and ethnicity, as well as improving education for 
 Table 3.5  Federal, state, and local share: public elementary and secondary school budgets 
 Year  Federal  State  Local 
 1920  0.3  16.5  83.2 
 1930  0.4  16.9  82.7 
 1940  1.8  30.3  68.0 
 1945  1.4  34.7  63.9 
 1950  2.9  39.8  57.3 
 1955  4.6  39.5  55.9 
 1960  4.4  39.1  56.5 
 1965  7.9  39.1  53.0 
 1970  8.0  39.9  52.1 
 1975  9.0  42.0  49.0 
 1980  9.8  46.8  43.4 
 1985  6.6  48.9  44.4 
 1990  6.1  47.3  46.8 
 1995  6.8  46.8  46.4 
 2000  7.3  49.7  43.0 
 2005  8.3  n.a.  n.a. 
 2008  8.0  48.0  44.0 
 2009  9.5  46.7  43.8 
 2010  13.0  43.0  44.0 
 2012  12.3  n.a.  n.a. 
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English language learners, women, and children with disabilities. Now, I offer some 
policy suggestions for ways to move U.S. education forward. 
 Reassessing the Federal Role 
 First, we should de-emphasize the role of the federal Department of Education in 
K-12 standards-based reform from defi ning and enforcing the details of school 
reform to a collegial support role. The states and districts will have an unprece-
dented challenge to implement the Common Core in addition to their other duties. 
Common Core has created a host of new policy questions that must be made by 
states and districts, not by the federal government or the Common Core national 
administration. These include which assessment system to choose; how to phase in 
these new assessments and standards into already complex systems of  curriculum , 
testing, and accountability; how to produce or purchase curriculum materials that 
will serve their needs and comport with Common Core standards; how to provide 
the requisite teacher education and professional development; and how to guarantee 
that students in the least effective schools will have equal access to what they need 
to achieve in the Common Core. Given the importance of these decisions, which 
will manifest themselves differently in the various states, it may be an opportune 
time to reconsider the relationship between the federal Department of Education 
and the states’ role in providing high-quality education and increasing educational 
opportunity. 
 Aside from challenges of the Common Core, there is a renewed sense among 
many educators that the states are “where the action is” and that on many matters 
the states can assess their needs, capacities, and priorities better than the federal 
government. This is not suggested in the spirit of a “kinder, gentler” face of the 
department or to “reduce” the federal role but to suggest some changes given the 
giant workload Common Core will generate for the districts and the states. 
Furthermore, in this past 23 years of standards-based reform, the states have had 
ample time to develop reform systems and accountability; most have more capacity 
than they have ever had. 
 One example of federal-state cooperation is suggested by a recent article about 
 California having some documented success with a state program of more extensive 
on-site technical assistance in individual districts (Strunk and McEachin  2014 ). If 
such successes continue, the Department of Education could disseminate informa-
tion about California and subsidize state education agencies so they can create such 
units or use California’s insights to strengthen their present technical assistance 
programs. 
 The relationship between Common Core and the Department of Education will 
continue to exist. It is hard to imagine that there will not be issues where adjust-
ments might have to be made in federal regulations or in Common Core procedures. 
One important area might be the relation of the Common Core’s heightened stan-
dards to possible disparate effects on economically disadvantaged students, students 
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of color, or other groups. Perhaps it would be appropriate for the department and the 
Common Core leaderships to collectively look at how the new, more challenging 
Common Core standards and activities are affecting the lowest achievers. One of the 
most important contributions the Department of Education has made during the 
long era of standards-based school reform has been, with the support of their 
Presidents, to press the states and districts to put special emphasis on helping low- 
achieving students coming from low-income families or students of color who so 
often encounter racial prejudice. I am confi dent that these and other issues are 
already under discussion as we move into a more collegial relationship between the 
department and the states. It will be interesting to see what the next reauthorization 
of ESEA says about the Common Core, and how the existence of the Common Core 
will impact on the Department of Education’s requirements for receipt of grants 
such as for Title I. 
 One of the risks of relying more on the states to carry the ball in school reform is 
that the states’ capacities are uneven, and they differ greatly in the achievement of 
their students and their progress in reform. The department could ameliorate that by 
incentivizing state action on various important national priorities. The incentives 
would be to subsidize the costs of introducing new or improved programs in return 
for reliable agreements to carry them out. The department could choose to start with 
two or three areas of reform. For example: 
 Early Childhood Education  Individual states have been the leaders in the reform 
of  early childhood education . (Rose  2010 ). The results have been quite different in 
these states that have led in attempting to upgrade early childhood opportunities by 
improving training and salaries, standards, and facilities. The federal government 
has endorsed this cause. 
 School Finance Equity  Here again, some states are leaders and are well down the 
road that ran through many courtrooms. The idea of federal subsidies to help other 
states was raised in the Department of Education’s Commission on School Finance a 
few years ago and would have the same effect as the early education option: stimulat-
ing reform and equalizing education across districts and across states (see Chap.  4 ). 
 Technical Assistance  As mentioned above, another subsidization idea is to support 
the state education agencies in providing enhanced technical assistance to districts. 
 Title I Improvements 
 Congress and the administration should approve the continuation of Title I, at a 
higher level of authorization. As we have seen, there is much divided opinion about 
the effectiveness of Title I in reducing achievement gaps between race-ethnic groups 
and between students from varying family income groups (free lunch, partial free 
lunch, and not-free lunch). I am an outsider to this literature, but it seems that the 
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lack of connection between Title I assignment and a student’s race or family income 
level renders most research results inconclusive in judging Title I’s effects. The 
federal government should make a major effort to support research that follows 
actual Title I students, tracking them through Title I instruction, and probing why 
children of color are now making better progress on improving scores and narrow-
ing gaps, while children from families with low income are not. 
 Income inequality, increasing since 1980, has devastating effects on most people 
in the lowest one-fi fth of the population and even above that. With people facing 
diffi culties related to low wages, unemployment, housing, and health care, this 
would be an illogical time to decrease our support for our main educational program 
aimed at children from poor families. 
 Additional Legislation 
 Major legislation regarding other programs that have attempted to lessen educa-
tional disadvantages and bias should be enacted. I do not know as much about cur-
rent policy controversies in these fi elds as I do about Title I. I should simply like to 
say that, as a historian, I believe that the programs included in this essay have 
achieved historically important breakthroughs yet still need further extension and 
reform. Because their principal object is to ensure specifi c group rights and they 
have been underfunded in the past, I believe that programs regarding these issues—
education of children with disabilities; bilingual education and other recognition of 
the needs of English language learners; women’s rights in education and their 
enforcement, and the improvement of Native American educational resources and 
governance—should be amply funded to the fullest extent allowed by the resources 
of the Congress and the nation. 
 Conclusion 
 The goal of this chapter was to assess the major efforts by the federal government 
(with an eye on major advances by the states) to widen educational opportunity. 
Efforts through the decades have been fi lled with frustrations, controversies, and 
imperfections. But in the end, I see progress. Despite their failings, I have come out 
of the process, on balance, more hopeful about the positive effects these initiatives 
might still provide. 
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